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PURPOSE, POLICING, AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT
NIREJ SEKHON*
Fourth Amendment cases are replete with references to “purpose.”
Typically, these references pertain to the motivations of individual officers
and occasionally to those of public institutions. That courts pay attention to
purpose is unsurprising. Across many areas of law, an alleged wrongdoer’s
intentions are often critical to determining liability, a remedy, or both.
Purpose analysis in Fourth Amendment cases, however, is surprisingly
confused. The Supreme Court has, without explanation, advanced separate
frameworks for analyzing purpose—objective, subjective, and
programmatic. The only consistent thing about the three approaches is that
they all fail to ensure that law enforcement agents behave transparently and
honestly. The failure is particularly worrisome because of the increasingly
salient role that purpose analysis has played in recent Supreme Court
cases.
This Article contends that courts and policy makers should use
purpose as an ex ante institutional design principle. This would be in stark
contrast to its current role as a judicial device for ascertaining an actor’s
past motivations. A single enforcement bureaucracy should not be
responsible for too broad a range of functions, particularly if those
functions implicate very different levels of state coercion—for example,
enforcing felony narcotics laws as opposed to traffic laws. Modern police
departments tend to have sprawling mandates that sometimes make it
impossible for policy makers and officers to differentiate and rank distinct
goals. Mandate sprawl is particularly problematic because it creates
opportunities for pretextual searches and seizures—police have access to a
broad range of rationales to justify conduct actually carried out for
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impermissible motives. Were enforcement bureaucracies required to
differentiate enforcement activities by purpose, it would go a long way in
curing this problem.
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INTRODUCTION
Fourth Amendment cases are replete with references to “purpose.”
Typically, the term pertains to an individual officer’s motivations for
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having undertaken specific acts.1 Occasionally, it pertains to a public
institution’s motivations for having undertaken a policy or practice.2 That
courts pay attention to state actors’ intentions in Fourth Amendment cases
is unsurprising. Across many areas of law, an alleged wrongdoer’s
intentions are often critical to determining liability, a remedy, or both. What
is surprising is how confused and inconsistent the Supreme Court’s analysis
of purpose is in Fourth Amendment cases. The Court uses entirely different
frameworks for evaluating purpose in different kinds of cases. Not only
does the Court fail to explain why it embraces different frameworks in
different contexts, but the only consistent thing about these approaches is
that they all fail to ensure that law enforcement agents behave transparently
and honestly. The failure is particularly worrisome because of the
increasingly salient role that purpose analysis has played in recent Supreme
Court cases.3
Recent opinions exemplify the conceptual murk surrounding purpose
and the Fourth Amendment. In Jardines v. Florida, the Court concluded
that it was a Fourth Amendment “search” for a police officer to walk a
“narcotics dog” up to the front door of a house to sniff for drugs.4 Thus, the
officer’s failure to obtain a warrant beforehand violated the Fourth
Amendment.5 The Court has increasingly relied upon trespass principles to
assess whether a state agent’s conduct was a “search.”6 This approach
requires evaluating the state agent’s purpose for “occup[ying] private
property.”7 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that the
officer’s purpose for approaching Jardines’s front door was to conduct a
criminal search.8 The Court was careful to qualify that its inquiry into
officer purpose was “objective.”9 The Court often qualifies its analysis of
1

See, e.g., Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1134–35 (2013); Jardines v.
Florida, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416–17 (2013); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404–05
(2006); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 811–13 (1996); Horton v. California, 496
U.S. 128, 138 (1990); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371–72 (1986).
2
See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1978–80 (2013); California v. Quon, 560
U.S. 746, 761 (2010); Ferguson v. Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 81–84 (2001); Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997); Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995);
New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 708–10 (1987).
3
See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (noting that the Government
installed GPS on a suspect’s vehicle “for the purpose of obtaining information”).
4
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416–17.
5
Id. at 1417.
6
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949–50.
7
Id.
8
Jardines, 133 S. Ct at 1417–18.
9
Id. at 1417.
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officer purpose in this way, noting the practical difficulties of ascertaining
an individual officer’s subjective intentions.10 While the Court’s analysis of
purpose in Jardines bears some resemblance to state of mind in criminal
law, the analogy is inapt because the assessment of purpose in criminal law
requires subjective analysis.11 As noted by the Jardines dissenters, what
“objective purpose” means is unclear.12
The Court’s framework for analyzing institutional purpose is also
confused, but for different reasons. The Court’s so-called programmaticpurpose inquiry has the air of doctrinal afterthought.13 The Court casts these
cases as “exceptions” to the Fourth Amendment’s general requirement that
there be individualized suspicion for a search or seizure.14 For example, in
Maryland v. King, the Court recently upheld suspicionless collection of
DNA from arrestees.15 The Court concluded that Maryland’s legislative
purpose in enacting the scheme was “administrative” as opposed to
“criminal.”16 The Court credited Maryland’s argument that the scheme’s
purpose was to enable law enforcement to accurately identify suspects for
booking.17 In dissent, Justice Scalia objected, stating that the majority
ignored the most obvious purpose for the Maryland scheme: solving open
criminal cases where there was a sample of suspect DNA.18 Crediting that
purpose, however, would have made it impossible to uphold the Maryland
scheme because a search for criminal evidence requires individualized
suspicion that the suspect committed a crime.19 More broadly, the
programmatic-purpose analysis in King bears no resemblance to the
objective purpose analysis in Jardines. King bears much greater
resemblance to the kind of deferential, “rational basis” review that one
might see in other constitutional law contexts. This, however, is puzzling
10

See, e.g., Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006) (qualifying “even if their
subjective motives could be so neatly unraveled”); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
814–15 (1996) (noting “the evidentiary difficulty of establishing subjective intent”).
11
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (defining purpose).
12
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423–24 (Alito, J., dissenting).
13
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45–47 (2000) (distinguishing
“programmatic purpose” from “subjective intentions,” which earlier opinions had held were
not to be considered in Fourth Amendment cases).
14
See, e.g., id. at 37 (summarizing cases). More specifically, the Court has developed its
programmatic purpose framework in the context of the so-called administrative and special
needs exceptions. For a fuller description, see infra Section I.C.
15
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2013).
16
Id. at 1971–72.
17
Id. at 1971–74.
18
Id. at 1982–83 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
19
Id. at 1983.
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given the Court’s statements in other cases that the programmatic-purpose
inquiry requires a searching analysis of an actor’s actual motivations.20
This Article offers a critical account of purpose’s role in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. First, it critiques the frameworks the Court
currently uses for evaluating purpose in Fourth Amendment cases. Second,
it offers a novel account of why the Court relies on different notions in the
individual and institutional decisionmaking contexts. The Court’s pervasive
but confused reliance on purpose in Fourth Amendment cases reflects
constitutional criminal procedure’s awkward role mediating between
criminal law and constitutional law. In each of these two fields, purpose has
a long and distinct conceptual lineage. In criminal law, purpose is a form of
mens rea. In constitutional law, purpose is a method of evaluating the
relationship between a state’s goals and the means by which it achieves
those goals.21 In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court uses purpose in a
manner that echoes both approaches, but only faintly.
The typical Fourth Amendment case presents a constitutional harm as
realized between two individuals, one of whom is a police officer.22 Such
“transactional framing” of disputes has generated constitutional principles
that seem writ small23—that is, narrow rules designed for officers’ conduct
in the field rather than broad principles of institutional design.24 The
purpose analysis that has evolved in these cases has the air of state-of-mind
analysis in criminal law. Police officers, however, are no ordinary
individuals. They are state agents. The point of a Fourth Amendment
suppression motion is to determine evidence’s admissibility, not to punish
individual officers for having behaved badly. The Court seems to recognize
20

See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (citing United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
46–47 (2000).
21
See infra notes 321–337 and discussion (discussing First and Fourteenth
Amendments).
22
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (requiring that defendant have
suffered personal injury for standing to assert to Fourth Amendment claim).
23
I borrow this expression from Daryl Levinson who uses it to describe courts’ and
commentators’ tendencies to conceptualize constitutional disputes as if realized between real
persons when they are not. Daryl Levinson, Framing Transactions in Constitutional Law,
111 YALE L.J. 1311, 1314 (2002). See also infra Section II.A.3.
24
This is likely why both courts and commentators tend to address the Fourth
Amendment as if its underlying concerns were distinct from constitutional law more
generally. See Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth Amendment
Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 200 (1993); Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies
in Criminal Adjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2001, 2001–02 (1998); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1131–33 (1991).
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this by insisting that its analysis of officer purpose is objective.25 By so
insisting, the Court rejects a subjective approach that evaluates a state
agent’s actual motivations. But that does not explain what objective purpose
means.
This Article contends that officers perpetrate a hoax of constitutional
significance whenever they behave pretextually—that is, when they act on
the basis of unconstitutional motives, but later claim some objective
rationale for their conduct. Because objective purpose cannot screen for this
kind of officer duplicity or confusion, it fails to meaningfully constrain
officer conduct. Although the expression suggests a concept with roots in
criminal law or torts, it has neither. Rather, it is a rhetorical device for
imputing the state’s broad, corporate intentionality to individual officers.
This is to conceive of individual officers, vis-à-vis individual citizens, as
the state incarnate. The argument is bolstered by the rare case in which the
Court permits analysis of officers’ subjective motivations—for example,
when the Fourth Amendment violation arises from an officer-judge
interaction, such as misrepresentations in a warrant application. It makes no
sense to conceive of an individual officer, vis-à-vis a judge, as the state
incarnate. In a divided state like our own, an enforcement agent’s
willingness to perpetrate a hoax upon a judge is particularly disruptive.
This, however, is more broadly true than just when an officer lies directly to
a judge. It is true whenever an officer evades constitutional principle by
ignorance or subterfuge.
The Court’s decision in King also suggests a tolerance for pretext
where institutional decisionmaking is concerned. This is ironic because the
Court has insisted that a programmatic-purpose inquiry should focus on the
state actor’s actual motivations.26 But the King Court refused to credit the
actual reason for the state’s DNA collection policy: solving open criminal
cases. This highlights how fundamental the outstanding questions regarding
programmatic purpose are. It is uncertain how intensive judicial scrutiny
should be, whether particular kinds of institutions are entitled to deference
(for example, state legislatures versus municipal police departments), or
how to evaluate institutions that are responsible for carrying out multiple

25

See supra note 1.
See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (citing United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)); see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,
45–47 (2000) (explaining the relevance of an officer’s subjective intent in the programmaticpurpose inquiry, and rejecting the Whren rule in the context of the Indianapolis drug
interdiction checkpoints).
26
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goals that span the civil–criminal divide (of which municipal police
departments are a prime example).
Normatively, this Article draws on political theory to argue that Fourth
Amendment purpose should ensure enforcement bureaucracies behave
honestly and transparently. To do this, purpose should serve as an ex ante
organizing principle for institutions. The Fourth Amendment should require
the state to narrowly define specific enforcement purposes and assign
responsibility to specific institutional actors for advancing each one. This
should be a prerequisite for a particular institution’s agents to conduct any
searches or seizures at all. This is in stark contrast to purpose’s current role
as a judicial device for untangling a state actor’s motivations after she has
already carried out a search or seizure.
The proposal here has far-reaching consequences for the organization
of municipal police departments. It would require the state to strip police
departments of at least some noncriminal functions. Where impractical to
do so, it would require rigid segregation of employees based upon function.
As matters stand, police departments tend to have sprawling mandates that
encompass both criminal and civil goals. This makes it difficult, if not
impossible, for policy makers and individual officers to differentiate and
rank distinct goals. In addition, because police departments have sprawling
mandates that include criminal and civil goals, officers have substantial
opportunities for pretextual searches and seizures. The incentive for
pretextual behavior will be particularly high where a state actor is
responsible for overlapping purposes, some of which are subject to more
stringent procedural constraints than others.
The DNA testing in King offers a provisional illustration of how the
proposal might function. To the extent that King permits DNA testing of
arrestees for administrative identification purposes,27 that function should
be assigned to dedicated administrative personnel who are segregated from
officers responsible for investigating crimes. Communication between the
two categories of personnel should be limited to constitutional purposes
only. The same principle supports stripping the police of some enforcement
duties altogether. For example, the Fourth Amendment currently allows
police to stop motorists at fixed roadblocks to check for sobriety.28 Officers
need not have individualized suspicion to do so, provided that the
roadblock’s purpose is preventing drunk driving.29 Practically speaking

27
28
29

Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1971–74 (2013).
See Mich. Dep’t State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
See id. at 450–51.
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though, police officers will advance that purpose by making arrests. In
addition, little prevents police officers from using the roadblock as an
opportunity to investigate crimes unrelated to drunk driving.30 This Article
suggests that a civil entity without arrest authority, like the Department of
Motor Vehicles, would be a more constitutionally trustworthy roadblock
administrator. Its incentives are better aligned with the roadblock’s
constitutionally permitted purpose: removing drunk drivers from the road.
The Article proceeds in three sections. Section I surveys the Court’s
pervasive reliance on the notion of purpose in Fourth Amendment cases,
identifying the three frameworks the Court deploys: objective, subjective,
and programmatic. Section II, the Article’s analytic heart, offers a critical
account of the Court’s reliance on purpose in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. Section III concludes by sketching a reform proposal.
I. PURPOSE IS UBIQUITOUS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES
There is scant literature addressing the ubiquitous references to
purpose in Fourth Amendment opinions. What little exists tends to narrowly
advocate for a subjective approach to evaluating individual officers’
intentions without recognizing the range of functions the concept serves.31
This oversight may occur because the Court does not generally rely on
purpose as the organizing principle for its Fourth Amendment analysis.
Purpose analysis is embedded within the two dominant approaches to
Fourth Amendment questions, “warrant plus exceptions” and “history plus
reasonableness.” The first approach, inaugurated by the Warren Court in
Katz v. United States,32 was once the preeminent approach. It required
30

See infra Section III.B.
See Craig M. Bradley, The Reasonable Policeman: Police Intent in Criminal
Procedure, 76 MISS. L.J. 339, 343 (2006) (arguing against objective test of purpose); John
M. Burkoff, Bad Faith Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 111 (1982) (same); George Dix,
Subjective “Intent” as a Component of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 76 MISS. L.J.
373, 377 (2006) (same); Brooks Holland, The Road ‘Round Edmond: Steering Through
Primary Purposes and Crime Control Agendas, 111 PENN ST. L. REV. 293, 308 (2006) (same
in cases involving suspicionless stops at roadblocks). In contrast this Article analyzes
different conceptions of purpose that the Court has adopted across Fourth Amendment
contexts. There is a growing literature regarding the role of “intention” in criminal
procedure, but these scholars do not generally address the Fourth Amendment. This is likely
because the Fourth Amendment is not limited to “criminal” cases. See infra Sections I.A–B.
See, e.g., Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
679, 720–21 (1999); Alice Ristroph, State Intentions and the Law of Punishment, 98 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1354–57 (2008); Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming
Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 126–29 (2008).
32
389 U.S. 347 (1967). This is the framework for how at least one leading textbook
31
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courts to decide whether police have obtained a warrant before searching, or
acted pursuant to a judicially specified exception to that requirement.33 In
recent decades, the Court has increasingly embraced a second approach. It
requires courts to determine what common law practice was when the
Fourth Amendment was drafted and, where unclear, to use open-ended
interest balancing to assess Fourth Amendment claims.34 Scholarly critiques
of these two different frameworks are legion,35 but overlook what the two
approaches share: an attention to state actors’ purpose. The Court’s analysis
of purpose cuts across the two dominant approaches to the Fourth
Amendment.
The background discussion below shows that the Supreme Court has
failed to develop a consistent framework for analyzing purpose in Fourth
Amendment cases. As detailed in Section A, in cases involving individual
state agents, the Court usually insists that analysis of purpose is objective,
but fails to account for what that means. There are rare occasions identified
in Section B where the Court permits subjective analysis of officer purpose.
Section C surveys the so-called administrative and special needs cases
where the Court has embraced an altogether different approach to purpose,
which it describes as programmatic. The Court has repeatedly stated that
this requires evaluation of a state actor’s actual motivations.36 But the Court
has not been consistent in heeding its own words.37
teaches the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., RONALD ALLEN, ET AL., COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE xiv–xvi (3d ed. 2011) (beginning with Katz and following with exceptions).
33
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
34
Justice Scalia has, quite successfully, spearheaded this common-law driven approach.
See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 1739, 1748–61 (2000) (describing the approach).
35
See, e.g., id.; Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order
Originalism: A Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine
Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 246 (2002); Kathryn R. Urbonya,
Rhetorically Reasonable Police Practices: Viewing the Supreme Court’s Multiple Discourse
Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1390 (2003). This scholarship tends to assail the
jurisprudence for being too ad hoc, see, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First
Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 758–60 (1994); Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael
Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 29–30 (1988),
and for inadequately protecting individual rights, see, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, Innocence,
Privacy, and Targeting in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1456, 1522
(1996) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment should protect against targeting harm); Eve
Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 254, 278–79
(2011) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment allows police too much latitude in
administrative searches).
36
See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011) (citing United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001)); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46–47
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A. ANALYSIS OF OFFICER PURPOSE IS USUALLY OBJECTIVE

In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court usually insists that officer
purpose be evaluated from an objective perspective. When explanation is
offered for this at all,38 it is thin, hinging on the plain meaning of the word
reasonable in the Fourth Amendment’s text or the supposed evidentiary
difficulties that subjective analysis entails.39
1. Individualized Suspicion Requires Objective Analysis of
Officers’ Purpose
In Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, individualized suspicion is the
paradigmatic purpose inquiry.40 It requires that an officer have either
probable cause or reasonable suspicion before searching or seizing.41
Probable cause exists when the observable facts suggest “a fair probability
that . . . evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”42 It takes
fewer and less incriminating facts to generate reasonable suspicion.43
Because probable cause is more stringent, it also permits a farther-reaching
search than does reasonable suspicion. When an officer lawfully searches
pursuant to probable cause, her search may extend as far as reasonably
necessary to locate the evidence for which she has probable cause.44 An
officer acting pursuant to reasonable suspicion, however, may only conduct
a brief investigative interview and a limited “pat down” for weapons.45
The individualized suspicion requirement generates a series of puzzles
about officer error and duplicity.46 An officer might search based on the
subjective belief that the observed facts give rise to individualized suspicion
(2000).
37
See infra Section II.B.3.
38
See, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011) (stating that the Court has
consistently rejected the subjective approach, but without explanation for why).
39
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996).
40
Cf. Maryland v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1967) (suggesting that probable
cause ensures that there is a sufficient nexus between a piece of evidence and the
government’s “purpose of proving crime”). Although exceptions have proliferated, the Court
still describes individualized suspicion as a touchstone for a legitimate search or seizure. See
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 37.
41
See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 548, 654–55, 655 n.11 (1979).
42
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983).
43
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
44
See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982) (discussing search of an
automobile).
45
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1968).
46
See Dix, supra note 31, at 441–44.
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when they actually do not. Alternatively, an officer might search believing
that the observable facts do not give rise to individualized suspicion when
they actually do. Parallel questions exist as to the applicable criminal law.
An officer might search believing that one criminal law has been violated
when, in fact, it is actually some other. Alternatively, an officer might
search despite her belief that no criminal law had been violated when one
actually had been.
The Court’s one-word solution to these puzzles has been “objective.”
A search or seizure is lawful provided that the objectively observable facts
give rise to individualized suspicion.47 Generally, a search that could not
have occurred absent the investigating officer’s error is unconstitutional,
while a search that could have occurred absent the error is constitutional.48
An officer’s subjective belief that there was individualized suspicion will
not make a search valid if she was objectively wrong.49 By the same token,
if the objectively observable facts supported individualized suspicion, it
does not matter that the investigating officer searched without subjectively
believing that there was individualized suspicion.50 Parallel principles apply
to officers’ legal conclusions. If the objectively observable facts suggested
that a suspect violated a criminal law, it does not matter that the law was
not the one that the investigating officer actually thought the suspect
violated.51
That a search or seizure, objectively speaking, could have occurred
under some criminal law does not mean that it, empirically speaking, would
have occurred. The gap between theoretical and empirical is potentially
vast, given police officers’ broad discretion not to enforce criminal laws.
Officers routinely overlook criminal law violations.52 That a reasonable
47

See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996).
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 3.2(b) (5th ed. 2012) (discussing United
States ex rel. Senk v. Brierley, 381 F. Supp. 447 (M.D. Pa 1974), United States v. Day, 455
F.2d 454 (3d Cir. 1972), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)).
49
Cf. id. (discussing, in the context of Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964), that an
officer’s good faith, subjective belief that he had grounds to make an arrest is insufficient to
support an otherwise improper arrest).
50
See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507 (1983) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he fact that
the officers did not believe there was probable cause and proceeded on a consensual or
Terry-stop rationale would not foreclose the State from justifying Royer's custody by
proving probable cause and hence removing any barrier to relying on Royer's consent to
search.”); Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 802–05 (1971) (holding that the police arrested
the wrong individual, but that the mistake was reasonable).
51
See Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004).
52
See Nirej Sekhon, Redistributive Policing, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1171,
1175–77 (2011).
48
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officer could have permissibly searched or seized does not mean that she
would actually have done so. In Atwater v. Lago Vista, the Court held that
an arrest characterized by “gratuitous humiliations” does not violate the
Fourth Amendment so long as it is supported by probable cause.53 In
Atwater, a police officer arrested a “soccer mom” for a seatbelt violation.54
Atwater argued that the officer behaved unreasonably even though the
officer had probable cause to arrest.55 While the Court agreed that the
officer exercised “extremely poor judgment,”56 it refused to look beyond
whether his conduct was supported by probable cause—which it was.57
An objective approach is also problematic because it creates
considerable latitude for officers to behave pretextually.58 In Whren v.
United States, undercover narcotics officers pulled Whren over for a traffic
violation and subsequently found narcotics.59 Whren, who was black,
conceded that he had violated a traffic law.60 However, he argued that the
stop would not have occurred absent the investigating officers’ ulterior
motive: to find drugs.61 Whren further argued that the investigating officer
impermissibly relied upon Whren’s race to predict the presence of narcotics
in his car.62 A police department regulation limited when undercover
officers were supposed to make traffic stops.63 Whren argued that a
reasonable undercover officer would not have violated the regulation and
pulled Whren over for a traffic violation.64 The Court refused to consider
what a reasonable officer would have done in the same circumstance,
derisively casting it as a subjective inquiry into the investigating officer’s
motives, a task fraught with metaphysical uncertainty and evidentiary
peril.65
53

532 U.S. 318, 347, 354 (2001).
Id. at 323–24.
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Id. at 346–47.
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Id. at 346–50.
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Id. at 354.
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See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at § 1.4(f) (discussing pretext and Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)); see also id. at § 3.2(b) (discussing problems associated with
pretext in the context of police authority and discretion, broadly, and with regard to
subjective intentions and Whren).
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517 U.S. 806, 808–09 (1996).
60
Id. at 810.
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Id. at 809.
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Id. at 810.
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Id. at 815.
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Id. at 816–17.
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Rather, the Court simply dismissed the entire question calling it an exercise in “virtual
subjectivity.” Id. at 814–15.
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Together, Whren and Atwater mark the triumph of theoretical over
empirical—could over would. The Court will assume that a police officer
was motivated by individualized suspicion whenever theoretically possible
that an officer in her position could have been.
2. Objective Purpose Is Increasingly Central to Determining if a
Search Occurred
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jardines66 suggests that
purpose will play a more significant role in determining whether the Fourth
Amendment applies at all. The Fourth Amendment only restrains conduct
that is defined as a search or seizure.67 The Court has defined the standard
for whether a seizure occurred in terms of officer purpose.68 In Brower v.
Inyo, the Court concluded that a seizure occurs when the police
“intentionally appl[y]” force to subdue a suspect.69 The inquiry is
objective.70
In Katz, the Court held that a search occurs when an officer intrudes
upon a privacy interest that that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable.71 As Professor Amsterdam recognized forty years ago, this
ostensibly populist conceptualization does not readily translate into an
administrable doctrinal test.72 Commentators have rightly criticized the
resultant search jurisprudence as ad hoc and unprincipled.73 Justices have
previously hinted that analyzing officer purpose could play a role in making
search jurisprudence more consistent and rigorous.74 In Jardines, the Court
appeared to require just such an inquiry.75 In Jones v. United States, when it
concluded that the installation of a GPS device was a search, Justice Scalia
hinted that officer purpose will play a central role in this new approach.76 In
Jardines, he gave fuller expression to that notion.
66

133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
68
See Brower v. Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 597 (1989).
69
Id. The test for whether a seizure occurred varies with context. See, e.g., United States
v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 201 (2002) (“If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate
the encounter, then he or she has not been seized.”).
70
Brower, 489 U.S. at 597.
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389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
72
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349, 386 (1974) (discussing “the problems of formulating such a basic conception”).
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See supra note 35.
74
See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 341–42 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013).
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132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“The Government physically occupied private property
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In Jardines, a police officer used Franky, a narcotics-sniffing dog to
confirm an unverified tip that Jardines was growing marijuana in his
home.77 Without having obtained a warrant, the officer approached
Jardines’ home with Franky.78 Franky sniffed the front door and “alerted.”79
The officer then obtained a warrant to search Jardines’s home.80 It turned
out that Franky had been correct.81 Jardines moved to suppress the
marijuana evidence, arguing that the officer’s use of Franky on the doorstep
was a search that required a warrant.82
The Court focused on the officer’s purpose in approaching Jardines’s
home.83 The Court has increasingly relied upon property law concepts in
analyzing whether a search occurred.84 Writing for the majority in Jardines,
Justice Scalia noted that under the Fourth Amendment, the home “is first
among equals.”85 This was based on the Founding Era understanding that
“property of every man [is] so sacred, that no man can set his foot upon his
neighbor’s property without leave.”86 “Leave” may be inferred from
national custom-that is, Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters typically have a
license to approach one’s front door.87 That license, however, is “limited
not only to a particular area, but also to a specific purpose.”88 According to
the Court, it does not extend to those whose purpose is to conduct a
search.89 The Court in Jardines, however, took pains to qualify that its
purpose inquiry was objective. It stated that the officer’s conduct was a
search because it “objectively reveal[ed] a purpose to conduct a search,
which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.”90 But it is
unclear what this means. In dissent, Justice Alito speculated that it might

for the purpose of obtaining information.”).
77
133 S. Ct. at 1413.
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Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id. at 1416–17.
84
See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949–50 (2012) (invoking English
common law principles).
85
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
86
Id. at 1415 (citing 2 Wils. K.B. 275, 291, 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817). However, this is not
based on any specific principle of trespass. See id. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 1415.
88
Id. at 1416.
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Id.
90
Id. at 1417.
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mean that objective facts reveal the officer’s subjective purpose.91 This,
however, is just a subjective test—whenever a court is asked to determine
an actor’s subjective mental state, it must answer based upon the objective
facts that are part of the record.
3. Many Exceptions Turn on Objective Purpose
Although the Court has stated that a warrant based upon probable
cause is a prerequisite for any search or seizure,92 exceptions abound.93
When one of these exceptions turns on officer purpose, the Court has
generally embraced an objective approach, meaning that officers’ ulterior
motives are of no constitutional consequence. If a reasonable officer could
have availed herself of the exception, then it does not matter that an actual
officer did so with an ulterior motive that would have been unconstitutional
standing alone. Four examples follow: exigency, plain view, third-party
consent, and inevitable discovery.
In its most recent exigency case, King, the Court expressly disavowed
subjective purpose analysis.94 The exigency exception permits police
officers to conduct a warrantless search or seizure where there is probable
cause and an exigency that makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant—for
example, when there is a fleeing suspect.95 In King, the Court considered
whether the exception applies when officers themselves create the
exigency.96 The officers knocked on a suspected drug dealer’s door and, “as
loud as [they] could,” yelled, “This is the police” or “Police, police, police,”
inducing the suspects to begin destroying evidence.97 Relying on objective
analysis, the Court held that whether the police deliberately or negligently
induced the destruction of evidence does not matter so long as they “d[id]
not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or threatened violation of
the Fourth Amendment.”98
91

See id. at 1423–24 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
93
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582–83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(surveying examples).
94
563 U.S. 452, 464 (2011) (“‘Our cases have repeatedly rejected’ a subjective
approach, asking only whether ‘the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action.’”
(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006))).
95
See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–99 (1967).
96
563 U.S. at 455.
97
Id. at 456.
98
Id. at 469 (finding no such violation because, as with a private citizen who knocks at
the door, occupants have no obligation to open the door for a police officer who knocks
without a warrant).
92
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In Brigham City v. Stuart, the Court held that exigency also permits a
warrantless search of a home when it is reasonable to think that someone
inside is in danger of imminent injury.99 In such a situation, the officer’s
purpose is ostensibly to provide aid, not to make arrests. The officers in
Stuart had responded to a call regarding a loud house party; upon arriving,
they observed a fight and intervened.100 The state court had held that the
exception does not apply if the officers subjectively intended to make
arrests.101 The Supreme Court rejected that approach, holding that a search
is constitutional if objective circumstances justify it.102 Echoing Whren, the
Court emphasized that the Fourth Amendment forbids only objectively
unreasonable searches without regard for the investigating officer’s actual,
subjective plan.103
The Court similarly refused to allow consideration of officers’
subjective motivations when claiming the plain view exception.104 This
exception permits an officer to seize evidence without a warrant if its
relevance to a crime is immediately apparent and she happens upon it while
lawfully present in the location.105 For example, if an officer happens upon
illegal narcotics while conducting a warrant search for illegal firearms in a
private home, she could seize the narcotics under the plain view exception.
Until the Court decided Horton v. California,106 many thought that officers
had to unwittingly come upon evidence of crime to claim the plain view
exception.107 In Horton, the Court held otherwise.108 The officer applied for
a warrant to search a home for the proceeds from a recent robbery in
addition to the firearms used by the suspects.109 The magistrate, however,
issued a warrant for the robbery’s proceeds only, not the weapons.110 While
executing that warrant, the officer discovered the weapons, not the
proceeds.111 The Court held that seizing the weapons was permissible under
99

547 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2005).
Id. at 401.
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Id. at 404.
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Id.
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See id. at 404–05.
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See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990).
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Id. at 134–36.
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496 U.S. 128.
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Justice Stewart suggested as much in Coolidge, albeit in a portion of the opinion that
failed to garner the majority. See 403 U.S. at 469–71.
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496 U.S. at 130, 142.
109
Id. at 130–31.
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Id. at 131.
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Id.
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the plain view exception.112 In rejecting that such discovery must be
inadvertent, the Court invoked its mantra that “objective standards of
conduct” better achieve “evenhanded law enforcement” than do subjective
standards.113
As in Whren and Stuart, Horton deems an officer’s ulterior motive
irrelevant. In Horton, it may have been an accident that the search warrant
failed to mention the weapons that the officer expected to discover—and
did ultimately discover.114 The opinion, however, does not recognize the
possibility that an officer might use the plain view exception instrumentally.
If an officer has a hunch, but not probable cause, that there is evidence
somewhere, she will have incentive to conduct a lawful search on whatever
basis she can muster. Plain view will permit her to seize the evidence she
actually sought (assuming her hunch was correct) even if the search would
never have occurred absent her ulterior motive.
The gap separating empirical from theoretical is apparent in the socalled third-party consent doctrine as well. Third-party consent is a species
of consent search that requires neither warrant nor probable cause.115 When
an individual agrees to permit a search, the police may conduct one. The
Court, however, has interpreted “voluntariness” with unusual generosity to
the police.116 Officers may obtain consent from a third-party who only
appears to have the authority to permit a search.117 In Illinois v. Rodriguez,
the police searched the defendant’s apartment relying upon his girlfriend’s
consent when she had no actual authority to provide it.118 The Court held
that the search was permissible provided that a reasonable officer would
have concluded that the consenter had authority to permit the search.119
The Court has also used objective analysis to limit the exclusionary
rule’s application. The exclusionary rule requires that courts exclude
evidence obtained as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation.120 This
means that guilty defendants will go free because the “constable has
112

See id. at 130. The Court also noted that inadvertence would not protect privacy
because, for the plain view exception to apply, the officer must already be conducting a
lawful search. Id. at 141–42.
113
Id. at 138.
114
See id. at 131, 138 n.9.
115
See Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1136–37 (2013).
116
For example, police officers’ failure to inform an individual of her right to refuse a
search does not vitiate that individual’s consent to said search. See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette,
519 U.S. 33, 39–40 (1996).
117
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 180, 187–89 (1990).
118
Id. at 179–80.
119
Id. at 188.
120
See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485–87 (1963).
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blundered.”121 Objective purpose analysis also ensures that the state is not
unduly punished for an investigating officer’s idiosyncratic perception error
when another officer could have lawfully carried out the same search or
seizure.122 In the same vein, the Court has created a host of exceptions to
the exclusionary rule. For example, inevitable discovery exempts evidence
that the police would have ultimately discovered absent the constitutional
violation.123 This species of harmless error is supposed to ensure that the
state is not left worse off than it would have been absent a constitutional
violation.124 For example, the defendant in Nix v. Williams divulged the
location of his victim’s body in response to unconstitutional questioning by
the police.125 In the meantime, the police had been coordinating a search for
the victim’s body. After the confession resulted in the recovery of the body,
the trial court concluded that the searchers eventually would have
discovered the body and refused to exclude the evidence.126 The Court
decided that there should be no inquiry into the whether the constitutional
violation was in bad faith. It curtly stated that it was implausible that
officers would ever take “dubious ‘shortcuts’” to obtain evidence that could
be obtained lawfully, or even be able to calculate the likelihood that
evidence would be discovered.127
B. SUBJECTIVE ANALYSIS IS OCCASIONALLY PERMITTED

Now and then, the Court seems willing to scrutinize officers’
subjective motivations in connection with untruthful warrant applications.
For example, in Franks, the defendant challenged the affidavit supporting a
warrant application.128 In the application, the officer attested to interviewing
specific witnesses who confirmed that Franks’s typical work attire precisely
matched that of a rape suspect.129 The officer, however, had lied about
speaking with witnesses.130 The Court held that the exclusionary rule
applies if an officer was reckless or deliberately untruthful about material

121

People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (N.Y. 1926). Justice (then Judge) Cardozo’s
words remain a pithy statement of the exclusionary rule’s social cost.
122
See LAFAVE, supra note 48, at § 1.4(e).
123
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S 431, 444 (1984).
124
See id. at 443–44.
125
Id. at 436–37.
126
Id. at 437–38.
127
Id. at 445–46.
128
438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978).
129
Id. at 157.
130
See id. at 158.
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facts in a warrant application.131 The Court emphasized that it sought to
preserve the integrity of the magistrate’s function.132 Because warrant
applications are ex parte, even a conscientious magistrate could miss
deliberate or reckless untruths.133
In both United States v. Leon and Murray v. United States, the Court
reiterated that officers must be subjectively honest when seeking warrants.
In Leon, the Court approved the good-faith exception to the exclusionary
rule.134 Where an officer relies in good faith upon a warrant that is later
determined not to have been supported by probable cause, the exclusionary
rule does not apply—evidence seized pursuant to the faulty warrant remains
admissible.135 While the Court emphasized that good faith is an objective
inquiry, it reaffirmed Franks.136 The Court noted that an officer cannot have
acted in good faith if she was reckless or deliberately untruthful in her
warrant application.137
In Murray, the Court implied that subjective inquiry was necessary to
ascertain the purity of an officer’s choice to apply for a warrant.138 In
Murray, officers suspected that a large quantity of narcotics was being
stored in a warehouse.139 The officers confirmed their suspicion by illegally
entering the warehouse and observing narcotics.140 Only afterward did the
officers seek and receive a warrant to search the warehouse.141 The officers
did not mention the illegal search that had preceded their application.142 The
magistrate issued a warrant based on the information that the officers had
accumulated independent of the unlawful earlier search.143 The government
argued against exclusion because the warrant would have issued whether
the illegal search had occurred or not.144 Suppressing the evidence would
131

Id. at 171–72. If the officer lies in the affidavit, and what is left of the warrant
application after the false information is removed still sustains the conclusion that there was
probable cause for the search, then the warrant’s fruits need not be suppressed. Id. at 172 n.8.
132
See id. at 168–69.
133
See id.; see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (providing “that the
deference accorded to a magistrate's finding of probable cause does not preclude inquiry into
the knowing or reckless falsity of the affidavit on which that determination was based”).
134
Leon, 468 U.S. at 913, 922.
135
See id. at 919–22.
136
See id. at 922–23.
137
Id. at 926.
138
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 535 (1988).
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 535–36.
142
Id. at 543.
143
Id. at 542–43.
144
The so-called independent source exception to the exclusionary rule is animated by
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accordingly have left the government in a worse position than it would have
been had the illegal search not occurred.145 Although the Court accepted
this argument, it asked whether the search pursuant to the warrant “was in
fact a genuinely independent source” of the evidence seized.146 The Court
remanded for fact finding as to whether “the agents would have sought a
warrant if they had not earlier entered the warehouse.”147 That is tantamount
to asking what the agents’ purpose was in first entering the warehouse.148
There is no suggestion that this was—or could be—anything other than a
subjective inquiry into the agents’ motivations.
The Court has also expressly conditioned constitutionality upon
officers’ good faith in so-called inventory searches.149 Officers may conduct
an inventory search of an impounded automobile without a warrant or even
probable cause.150 An inventory search allows police to identify the contents
of such vehicles in order to protect owners against theft, protect the police
against claims of theft, and ensure police safety.151 The Court has repeatedly
approved inventory searches, but only on the condition that the police
department has standardized regulations governing their execution.152 The
Court has cautioned against pretextual use of inventory searches to
investigate crimes for which the officers do not have probable cause.153 The
Court, however, has muddled this invitation to engage in subjective inquiry.
In Stuart, the Court cast inventory search cases as permitting scrutiny of
programmatic purpose only, not officer motive.154 This invites the question
of how the two differ.
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AND OTHER SPECIAL NEEDS

In evaluating so-called administrative and special needs searches, the
Court has developed an entirely different framework for evaluating purpose
the same logic as the “inevitable discovery” exception discussed above. See id. at 537 (citing
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
145
See id. at 537.
146
Id. at 542.
147
Id. at 543.
148
The agents had argued that their purpose in entering the warehouse without a warrant
was to ensure that no evidence was destroyed while they obtained a warrant. Id. The district
court acknowledged this but did not make a specific factual finding as to independent source.
Id.
149
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 374 (1987).
150
Id. at 375–76.
151
Id. at 373–74.
152
See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990).
153
See Bertine, 479 U.S. at 376–77 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
154
547 U.S. 398, 405 (2006).
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than in the cases described above. The Court has called it “programmatic
purpose.”155 While the typical Fourth Amendment case involves a police
officer enforcing a criminal law, the state often searches and seizes to
advance noncriminal, regulatory interests—for example, enforcing the
building code,156 supervising state employees,157 enforcing rules at public
schools,158 and inspecting businesses that impact public health.159 In these
cases the Court balances the state’s programmatic purpose—provided that it
is not to investigate ordinary crime—for carrying out searches or seizures
against the individual intrusions that such conduct entails.160 The Court’s
recent decision in King,161 however, highlights the foundational questions
that remain unanswered with regard to programmatic-purpose analysis.162
First, whether the Fourth Amendment requires courts to evaluate a state
actor’s actual purposes, or whether hypothetical purposes might suffice.163
Second, whether courts must differentiate an actor’s primary purposes from
secondary and tertiary purposes, and if so, by what method.164
To understand why the Court takes a different approach to purpose in
the administrative and special needs contexts, one must understand the
history that has given rise to the patchwork of exceptions. It was not long
into the Warren Court’s expansion of criminal procedure rights that it
confronted a noncriminal regulatory search. In Camara v. City of San
Francisco,165 the Warren Court decided that a housing inspector need not
demonstrate individualized suspicion to obtain a warrant for an
administrative search to ensure building code compliance.166 While
breaking from precedent that had held no warrant was required,167 Camara
held that a warrant could issue upon a showing that the state had a

155

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 45 (2000).
Camara v. San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
157
California v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010).
158
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
159
See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
160
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42, 44 (2000).
161
133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
162
See infra notes 202–213 and accompanying text.
163
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011); see also Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997) (“Nothing in the record hints that the hazards respondents
broadly describe are real and not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity.”).
164
See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82–84 (2001) (distinguishing
a drug test program’s primary purpose from its secondary purpose).
165
387 U.S. 523 (1967).
166
Id. at 538–39.
167
See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372–73 (1959) (holding that there is no
warrant required for search by health inspector).
156
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reasonable basis for carrying out inspections in a particular area.168 When a
search target is part of an industry that is pervasively regulated—which
diminishes operators’ expectations of privacy—it may be subject to
administrative inspection without warrant.169 In Burger v. New York, for
example, the Court permitted a warrantless inspection of an auto yard
pursuant to New York State’s administrative scheme designed to prevent
auto thefts.170
The special needs exception evolved from the administrative search
cases.171 In New Jersey v. T.L.O., the Court held a principal’s warrantless
search of a public high school student’s purse for cigarettes did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.172 The Court’s reasonableness scale tipped toward
the school’s interest in maintaining order and away from the student’s
privacy interest.173 The Court subsequently expanded the special needs
exception to include “dragnet” type searches.174 For example, the Court has
permitted suspicionless searches at fixed roadblocks that are for the primary
programmatic purpose of stemming “the flow of illegal entrants” into the
United States,175 “preventing drunken driving,”176 or identifying evidence of
a recent crime.177
Until recently, it was reasonable to think that a legitimate “special
need” arose only when the state was trying to solve an empirically
demonstrated problem. In Vernonia School District v. Acton, the Court
upheld random, suspicionless drug testing of student athletes.178 In Acton,
the Court credited the school district’s showing that there was an actual
drug problem in the district, particularly among student athletes.179 In

168

Camara, 387 U.S. at 538–39.
See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
170
Id. at 718.
171
The early special needs cases explicitly rely on Camara. See New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); Primus, supra note 35, at 275–76. The expression “special needs”
was first used in a Supreme Court opinion by Justice Blackmun in concurrence in T.L.O.,
469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
172
469 U.S. at 328.
173
Id. at 339–40.
174
Dragnet searches are those “searches or seizures of every person, place, or thing in a
specific location or involved in a specific activity.” Primus, supra note 35, at 260. Professor
Primus argues that the Court should not have expanded the special needs exception to
include dragnet searches. See id. at 259–60, 309–10.
175
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976).
176
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
177
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 423 (2004).
178
515 U.S. 646 (1995).
179
Id. at 663.
169
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Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,180 a federal agency
successfully demonstrated that drug and alcohol testing was necessary to
respond to railroad accidents.181 The regulations were promulgated based
upon evidence of property damage and fatalities that alcohol and drugimpaired railroad employees were involved in.182 These interests
outweighed individual workers’ interest in privacy, particularly given that
the relevant regulations controlled agency discretion.183
In contrast to Acton and Skinner, in Chandler v. Miller the Court
concluded that Georgia’s interest in requiring drug and alcohol testing of
candidates running for office was not a special need.184 Georgia argued that
drug use could hamper elected officials’ job performance and undermine
public confidence in them.185 However, there was nothing in the record to
suggest that this had actually happened.186 Accordingly, the Court rejected
these arguments because they did not amount to a showing of “concrete
danger,” but rather were merely “hypothetical.”187
Not only has the Court suggested that the special needs exception
demands an actual problem but also it has noted that the problem cannot be
one of “ordinary crime control.”188 Without these requirements, the Court
was concerned that state actors would pretextually circumvent the
individualized suspicion and warrant requirements that apply in criminal
cases. For example, in both Acton and Von Raab, the Court seemed to give
significant weight to the fact that the suspicionless drug testing protocols
prohibited positive tests from being divulged to law enforcement.189 In
Skinner, there was no express prohibition on divulging positive test results
to law enforcement, but there was no suggestion of pretextual drug testing
180

489 U.S. 602 (1989).
Id. at 609–10.
182
Id. at 608.
183
Id. at 624.
184
520 U.S. 305, 321–22 (1997).
185
Id. at 318.
186
Id. at 321.
187
Id. at 319. But see Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). In
Von Raab, the Court permitted suspicionless drug testing of Customs officials who carried
firearms and worked with narcotics based upon hypothetical security and danger-related
problems. Id. at 669–71. The Court, however, rationalized this by underscoring the agency’s
“unique mission” as the “first line of defense” against narcotics smuggling. Id. at 668, 674.
This did not mollify Justice Scalia who contended that an empirically demonstrable problem
was necessary for a special needs search. Id. at 683–84 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
188
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
189
See Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995); Von Raab, 489 U.S. at
663, 666.
181
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to obtain convictions.190 Transferring evidence generated by a suspicionless
search to law enforcement sometimes provides good evidence of
unconstitutional pretext.191 For example, in Ferguson v. Charleston, a
public hospital tested maternity patients for cocaine use and the evidence
was turned over to prosecutors pursuant to official protocol.192 The Court
held the drug testing unconstitutional, rejecting the argument that it was
justified by the special need of protecting mothers’ and babies’ health.193
The police’s integral role in administering the testing program suggested
that its purpose was simply criminal law enforcement.194
The rule that ordinary crime control is not a special need presents
unique difficulty for police departments because crime control will always
be a background purpose.195 The Court nonetheless permits police
departments to conduct suspicionless searches under the special needs
exception.196 The Court requires that the primary programmatic purpose not
be crime control, but the secondary purpose can be.197 This means that
courts may treat similar instances of police conduct differently depending
on the motives underlying each instance.198 The Court has elaborated on the
primary–secondary distinction by casting the former as an “immediate
objective” and the latter as an “ultimate goal.”199 In Ferguson, the Court
acknowledged that the “ultimate” purpose of the maternity drug-testing
program may have been addiction remediation, but the “immediate” goal
was generating evidence of criminal misdeed.200 But this distinction is not
easily reconciled with other special needs cases involving police
departments. For example, in the roadblock cases, the immediate means
available to the police for advancing the ultimate goals of “interdicting the
flow of illegal entrants from Mexico” and eradicating “the drunken driving
problem” were enforcing criminal prohibitions.201
190

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 n.5 (1989).
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 80–81 (2000).
192
Id. at 71–73.
193
Id. at 81.
194
See id. at 82–83.
195
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46–47 (2000) (noting the
“challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry”).
196
See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 428 (2003), Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990).
197
See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82–84 (2001).
198
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46–47.
199
E.g., Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82–84.
200
Id. at 82–83.
201
Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976).
191
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King calls into question whether special needs requires an empirically
demonstrable problem at all.202 It also underscores the difficulty of
distinguishing primary from secondary purposes. In King, the Court
approved Maryland’s collection of DNA samples from arrestees based upon
the program’s secondary (maybe even tertiary) purpose rather than its most
obvious primary purpose. Maryland authorizes law enforcement agencies to
collect DNA samples from arrestees accused of certain violent felonies for
inclusion in the State’s DNA database.203 After arresting King for assault,
the police took a DNA sample from him. When compared to other samples
in the database, King’s DNA profile matched the DNA evidence collected
in an unsolved rape case.204 King challenged the DNA evidence’s admission
in the rape case against him because there was no probable cause to collect
the DNA.205 Had the State’s purpose been solving past crimes, the
individualized suspicion and warrant requirements would have applied.206
The Court, however, analyzed the DNA collection program using the same
species of reasonableness balancing used in the special needs cases.207 In
concluding that the balance of interests tipped in the government’s favor,
the Court credited the government’s interest in “proper[ly] processing . . .
arrestees.”208 That requires properly identifying arrestees which, in turn,
may facilitate an accurate determination of whether the individual is a flight
risk or poses danger to the community if released.209
The King Court paid scant attention to the program’s primary purpose
of investigating crime even though it was identified in the preface of the
law itself.210 Writing for four dissenting justices, Justice Scalia chided the
majority for paying no attention to the Maryland Legislature’s express
statement of purpose.211 In addition, the Maryland law forbade police from
testing arrestees’ DNA until first appearance, casting significant doubt on
202

See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969–70 (2013).
Id. at 1967.
204
Id. at 1966.
205
Id.
206
See id. at 1981–82 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
207
Id. at 1981–82, 1982 n.1. The majority denied that it applied the special needs
exception, stating that the exception “d[id] not have a direct bearing on the issues
presented . . . because unlike the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong,
a detainee has a reduced expectation of privacy.” Id. at 1978 (majority opinion). The Court
offered no support for the claim but, strangely, stated that the case’s outcome was supported
by the special needs cases. See id.
208
Id. at 1974.
209
Id. at 1972–73.
210
See id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
211
See id. at 1984.
203
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the majority’s suggestion that the legislature’s purpose was to facilitate
accurate identification and processing of arrestees.212 This is inconsistent
with the Court’s suggestion in earlier opinions that programmatic purpose
requires evaluation of the state’s actual reasons for carrying out searches.213
King highlights the confusion as to what programmatic-purpose
analysis requires, let alone how it relates to the notions of objective and
subjective purpose analysis that the Court has used in other Fourth
Amendment contexts.214
II. STATE PURPOSE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Having demonstrated the ubiquity and inconsistent application of
purpose in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this Section advances a
critical, descriptive account of the concept. It also explains the functions
that concept serves and why the Court has failed to fully develop it.
Section A demonstrates that despite that objective purpose has the
trappings of state-of-mind analysis in criminal law or torts, it ultimately
functions as a rhetorical device for imputing the state’s corporate
intentionality to individual officers. Objective purpose seems analogous to
state of mind only because the typical Fourth Amendment challenge arises
as an incident to an individual criminal case. This implicitly casts the
constitutional dispute as one between two individuals, an officer and a
suspect. But a police officer is not an ordinary individual. The Court’s
insistence that its analysis of purpose is objective reflects the officer’s status
as state agent. Section B shows that when evaluating institutional behavior
in special needs and administrative exception cases the Court uses
programmatic purpose as shorthand for constitutional means-ends testing.
The Court refuses to expressly draw the analogy, ensuring that
programmatic purpose remains much more schematic than means-ends
testing in other areas of constitutional law. The discussion below
demonstrates that this is because the Court is unable to identify whether
criminal enforcement is an end or a means. Thus, it is not only unclear what
programmatic purpose requires of institutional policy-making, but also
unclear what it requires of the relationship between an institution and its
agents in the field. A fully developed framework for addressing the latter
212

See id. at 1983.
See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2080–81 (2011); see also Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318–22 (1996) (discussing the state’s interest in passing a drug-testing
requirement for political candidates, and comparing the instant case to other special needs
cases).
214
See supra Section I.A.
213
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question could have radical normative consequences for Fourth
Amendment analysis. It is perhaps for that reason that the Court avoids it.
A. UNDERSTANDING OBJECTIVE PURPOSE

Court and commentators invoke the notion of objective purpose in a
manner that suggests mental-state analysis is used to evaluate individual
compliance with conduct rules.215 “Conduct rules” refer to laws that govern
individual behavior in society, such as tort and criminal laws.216 Section 1
below tests the analogy between objective purpose and mens rea, and
concludes that it fails. Section 2 then turns to the notion of decision rules in
search of definition. “Decision rules” dictate what remedies courts can
make available for conduct-rule violations and under what circumstances
the courts can grant them. The Court, for example, has directed judges not
to provide exclusion for many Fourth Amendment violations because doing
so has no deterrent effect on police. Where conduct rules are addressed to
individuals in society, decision rules are addressed to judges.217 Section 2
concludes that objective purpose makes as little sense in the context of
decision rules as it does in the context of conduct rules.
Having exhausted the most obvious sources of legal meaning for
objective purpose in Sections 1 and 2, Section 3 then offers an original
account grounded in philosophy and political theory. Section 3 shows that
objective purpose mediates between two contradictory conceptions of
police officers that awkwardly coexist in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The first conception relies on an individualistic, transactional frame to cast
police officers in “cops and robbers” terms. The second conception relies on
a broader, corporate frame to cast police officers as the State incarnate.
1. Conduct Rules
Because criminal procedure governs the investigation and enforcement
of criminal law violations, there is appeal in thinking of it as akin to
criminal law for police officers.218 Criminal law, of course, conditions
215

Virtually all of the commentary on the subject frames the subjective-objective
question in a manner that suggests such a framing. See sources cited supra note 31.
216
Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2469–70 (1996) (adopting the terminology
and concept from Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1984)).
217
See id.
218
See id. at 2534 (“[T]he constitutional rules promulgated under the Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Amendments are a species of substantive criminal law for the police: they are the
conduct rules that the Supreme Court wants the police to follow just as substantive criminal
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punishment upon the wrongdoer’s state of mind, or mens rea, of which
“purpose” is the most exacting.219 For crimes of purpose, the state must
show that it was the defendant’s desire to produce the forbidden result.220
As discussed in Part I above, the Court regularly refers to officer purpose
but disavows subjective analysis.221
The objective purpose inquiry that the Court uses in Fourth
Amendment cases, however, is not analogous to mens rea in criminal
law.222 Purpose, however, generally requires a subjective inquiry while
negligence generally requires objective inquiry.
Neither retributivist nor utilitarian accounts—the two dominant
sources of criminal law theory—of mens rea satisfactorily explain the
notion of objective purpose. Retributivist accounts are grounded in moral
individualism and require subjective blameworthiness as a prerequisite for
punishment.223 That an alleged wrongdoer made a morally incorrect choice
is the sine qua non of blameworthiness, and mens rea is criminal law’s most
salient mechanism for distinguishing between its degrees. Purpose describes
the most culpable mental state.224 It is, by definition, subjective.225
Objective purpose, therefore, makes no sense.
Utilitarian theory is better equipped to afford definition of objective
purpose, but it fails to offer a complete account. Utilitarianism describes a
range of theories that are concerned with maximizing future welfare.226
Exclusion is the typical remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. The
Court has made clear that this remedy’s only purpose is to deter police
prohibitions are the conduct rules that the legislature wants individual citizens to follow.”).
219
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02.
220
Id.
221
One might object that the Court uses the term purpose to mean something more akin
to officer motive than mens rea. While criminal law distinguishes between the two, there is
considerable slippage between the two in practice. A number of criminal laws authorize
punishment based upon motive—such as hate crimes and sex crimes, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
249(a)(1)—and, more generally, motive often supplies evidence of mens rea.
222
For a different view, see Alice Ristroph, Covenants for the Sword, 61 U. TORONTO
L.J. 657, 671–74 (2011) (arguing that “it is . . . useful to think of the [objective
reasonableness] inquiry as a variant of a mental-state requirement”).
223
See Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV.
453, 457 (1997).
224
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a)(1) (defining purpose). To take a textbook example,
one who deliberately kills pursuant to a plan is worse than one who does so accidentally. See
JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW 346–50 (7th ed. 2012).
225
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(a)(1).
226
See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 22–27 (2005) (reviewing classical utilitarian
theories); Robinson & Darley, supra note 223, at 458–68 (describing theories and identifying
limitations).
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officers from committing future constitutional violations, not to compensate
the defendant for the constitutional harm he endured.227 The point is to
advance the interests that underlie the Fourth Amendment—privacy,
liberty, and dignity—not to establish whether a particular officer is
blameworthy.228
From a utilitarian vantage, categories of intention are significant only
to the extent that they distinguish would-be wrongdoers based on how
readily they might be deterred in the future.229 Mental-state requirements
simply reflect the policy conclusion that a more significant sanction is
required to deter those who intentionally misbehave than those who
accidentally do.230 In other words, specific mens rea categories are just
placeholders for psychological generalizations about particular categories of
offenders. So long as the rules actually deter misconduct, the legal label’s
227

See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (“[T]he exclusionary
rule is not an individual right and applies only where it ‘result[s] in appreciable deterrence.’”
(second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984))).
The exclusionary remedy has influenced the development of substantive Fourth Amendment
rights. Nancy Leong, Improving Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 377, 388–90 (2014). Fourth
Amendment questions are typically adjudicated incident to criminal cases where exclusion is
the only available remedy. Id. at 388. Of course, a civil remedy is available in other contexts,
principally § 1983 suits. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). In that context, qualified immunity and
municipal liability doctrines create a more significant role for subjective notions of fault. See
Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L. REV. 583, 589,
667–70 (1998); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under §1983: Municipal Liability for
State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503, 1504 (1999). Qualified immunity only
permits an officer to be held individually liable for violating the Fourth Amendment (or any
other federal right) when the Fourth Amendment right violated was clearly established. See
Armacost, supra, at 619–24. This is plausibly understood as tantamount to a fault
requirement, although the Court’s most recent opinion on the subject tends to suggest
otherwise. See id. But see Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1248 n.6 (2012). A
municipality may only be held liable where it specifically authorized the violation or was
deliberately indifferent to training its personnel not to commit such. See Monell v. Dep’t of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Commentators have noted that this is also akin to a
subjective fault standard. See Brown, supra, at 1503–04; see also Teressa E. Ravenell,
Blame It on the Man: Theorizing the Relationship Between § 1983 Municipal Liability and
the Qualified Immunity Defense, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 153, 175 (2011) (stating that “the
Court's approach to municipal liability incorporates questions of fault and blame,” and
giving examples).
228
There are criminal laws for punishing officers for particularly egregious Fourth
Amendment violations. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2013).
229
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2011) (“When the police
exhibit ‘deliberate,’ ‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment
rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs.”
(quoting Herring, 555 U.S. at 143)).
230
See KAPLAN, supra note 224, at 35–46.
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lexical integrity or consistency is not important. By this view, the Court just
uses “objective purpose” metaphorically. But the question remains as to
what precisely “objective purpose” is a metaphor for.
The most intuitive, utilitarian explanation is that objective purpose
roughly tracks negligence. Whether in tort or criminal law, liability for
negligence arises for failures to behave in accordance with an objective
standard of care, whether deliberate or not.231 For example, where an officer
accidentally draws the wrong conclusion from the available facts as to
whether individualized suspicion is present in a particular case, the officer’s
good faith will not foreclose exclusion.232 In tort and criminal law, the
hypothetical exercise of imagining what a reasonable person would have
done in the same circumstances as the alleged wrongdoer creates the
baseline from which to measure whether the alleged wrongdoer engaged in
misconduct.233 In Fourth Amendment cases, the Court has identified the
standard in terms of a hypothetical “objectively reasonable police
officer.”234
The analogy between objective purpose and negligence is, however,
superficial at best. First, the Court has explicitly refused to permit exclusion
for official negligence in some Fourth Amendment cases.235 Second, the
reasonable police officer does not seem to function as an empirical baseline
for assessing officer behavior. Empirical here refers to an average based
upon actual observations of how others in the relevant community actually
behave.236 It is unclear which police officers’ conduct is to be “averaged,” if
that is even possible.237 Police officers are a diverse lot and how any one of
them might behave likely turns on various occupational and other
characteristics. For example, the reasonable narcotics officer and reasonable
patrol officer look at the world through different eyes.238 Whereas a
231

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283.
See supra Section I.A.
233
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (defining criminal negligence as a substantial
deviation from what a reasonable person would have done in the same circumstances); see
also Allen D. Miller & Rohen Perry, The Reasonable Person, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 323, 324–
25 (2012) (describing in torts context).
234
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
235
See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2434 (2011) (denying exclusionary
remedy for good faith reliance on unconstitutional statute); Herring v. United States, 555
U.S. 135, 141–43 (2009) (illustrating the same for police negligence with regard to updating
status of active warrants that are outstanding).
236
See Miller & Perry, supra note 233, at 370–71 (summarizing features of the model).
237
But see id. at 325.
238
See EDWARD CONLON, BLUE BLOOD 158 (2004) (comparing personal experience as
narcotics officer versus patrol officer).
232
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specialized narcotics officer is trained to identify narcotics transactions and
devote his efforts to doing so, a patrol officer will expend her labor on more
varied tasks.239 These differences will have considerable bearing on how
each of the two officers interprets and reacts to her environment. The latter
may not notice, let alone take any action against, two individuals who
engage in a quick hand-to-hand exchange on the street, while the former
sees a narcotics transaction.
The Court specifically disclaimed an empirical formulation of the
reasonable officer in both Whren and Atwater. In each of those cases, the
Court was unmoved by the argument that a reasonable officer in the same
position as the investigating officer would not have behaved as the
investigating officer did.240 In Atwater, the Court explicitly recognized that
a reasonable officer would not have behaved as the arresting officer had.241
If not empirical,242 the hypothetical reasonable officer must function as
a normative baseline in some other way.243 One can often discern such
normative judgments in the traits that are attributed to the hypothetical,
reasonable person. Those traits of the putative wrongdoer that are included
and excluded from the reasonable person’s profile represent normative
judgments about what the law is trying to accomplish and to whom it is
directed. But, again, the Court has refused to define the reasonable officer
in terms of salient occupational or other characteristics. This leaves the
standard so highly abstracted from any actual officer that it does not seem
like a surrogate for a police officer at all.244 For example, in Atwater, after
noting the officer’s “extremely poor judgment” and “gratuitous
humiliation[]” of Atwater, the Court upheld the arrest because, objectively,
there was probable cause for a seatbelt violation.245 As developed further in
Section 3 below, the reasonable officer standard better approximates a
hypothetical magistrate than a police officer.
239

See id.; DAVID E. BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY 14 (2000) (noting
study that found patrol officers spend less than fifteen percent of on-duty time fighting
crime); David Weisbund & John E. Eck, What Can Police Do to Reduce Crime, Disorder,
and Fear?, 593 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 42, 44, 49–51, 57 (2009).
240
See supra notes 52–65 and accompanying discussion.
241
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001).
242
See Miller & Perry, supra note 233, at 325 (arguing that such a conception is
theoretically impossible).
243
See Victoria Nourse, After the Reasonable Man: Getting over the Subjectivity/
Objectivity Question, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 33, 33–34 (2008) (arguing that the “reasonable
man” is an institutional “heuristic” for negotiating “majoritarian norms”).
244
See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996) (noting that the
personnel manual suggested that undercover officers were not to behave as traffic officers).
245
Atwater, 532 U.S. 318 at 346–47, 354.
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2. Decision Rules
Just as the conduct-rule analogy between criminal procedure and
criminal law fails to produce a satisfactory account of objective purpose, a
decision-rule analogy also fails to do so. Objective purpose analysis leads
courts to ignore officers’ deliberate violations of Fourth Amendment
conduct rules by instrumentally relying upon a decision rule. This defeats
the purpose of having decision rules, as highlighted by the isolated
instances where the Court seems to authorize subjective analysis to ensure a
decision rule’s integrity.246
In an ideal world there would be “acoustic separation” preventing the
individuals who are subject to a set of conduct rules from hearing the
content of judges’ decision rules.247 This would ensure that individuals did
not instrumentally rely on decision rules when making choices about
whether to comply with conduct rules.248 Carol Steiker famously relied on
the distinction and noted that there is no acoustic separation between police
officers and courts.249 Officers can easily learn decision rules’ content and
exploit that knowledge to strategically violate conduct rules.250
Distinguishing between accidental and deliberate violations of
criminal procedure decision rules would be a way to make up for acoustic
separation’s impossibility.251 For example, in the case of “inevitable
discovery,” evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment would,
in theory, have eventually been discovered lawfully had the violation never
occurred.252 According to the Court, exclusion thus leaves the state worse
off and the defendant better off than if the violation had never occurred.253
246

See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542–43, 443 n.3 (1988) (implying that it
is appropriate for a magistrate to determine whether the fruits of an illegal search motivated
application for search warrant); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975) (stating that
officers’ purposeful violation of Fourth Amendment is factor in determining whether a
subsequently obtained confession is admissible). See also supra Section I.B.
247
See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decisions Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 625 (1984) (coining the term acoustic separation,
and defining it as “an imaginary world in which only officials know the content of the
decision rules and only the general public knows the content of the conduct rules”).
248
See id. at 633 (describing defense of duress as decision rule).
249
Steiker, supra note 216, at 2471, 2534.
250
See id. at 2535 n.329.
251
See id. at 2471, 2533.
252
See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44, 443 n.4 (1984).
253
Id. at 444. Carol Steiker argued that the Burger and Rehnquist courts were able to
undercut the Warren Court’s expansion of criminal procedure conduct rules by creating
decision rules that permit courts to deny remedies for conduct-rule violations. Steiker, supra
note 216, at 2504.
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Under ideal conditions, “acoustic separation” between courts and police
would prevent officers from learning of the inevitable discovery principle.
In practice, though, police have ready access to decision rules.254
The Court’s opinions in Brown v. Illinois and United States v. Murray
hinted at a willingness to use subjective purpose as an imperfect substitute
for acoustic separation.255 Ordinarily, the Court will not apply the
exclusionary rule where the causal relation between the Fourth Amendment
violation and the incriminating evidence is attenuated.256 In Brown,
however, the Court stated that this principle may not apply where the
constitutional violation was purposeful.257 In Murray, officers seized
narcotics pursuant to a warrant, but that warrant had been obtained
following an illegal “sneak and peek” search confirming the contraband’s
presence.258 The Court held that evidence should be suppressed unless the
warrant-issuing magistrate had an opportunity to decide whether the illegal
search actually motivated the officers’ decision to seek a warrant.259 This
seems to invite magistrates to delve into officers’ subjective motivations,
although the Court does not state that explicitly. Even if so, Brown and
Murray are hard to generalize upon.
In the main, the Court is nearly as disinterested in subjective analysis
in the context of decision rules as it is in the context of conduct rules. For
example, in Nix v. Williams, the Court allowed officers’ deliberate
exploitation of a decision rule to stand.260 The Court held that the officers’
bad faith had no bearing on the inevitable discovery doctrine’s
application.261 Even more striking was the Court’s decision in United States
v. Payner.262 There, IRS agents instrumentally relied upon Fourth
Amendment standing rules to break into a banker’s hotel room and steal
documents that incriminated Payner.263 Fourth Amendment standing
254

See Steiker, supra note 216, at 2471, 2534.
See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542–43, 443 n.3 (1988) (implying that it
is appropriate for a magistrate to determine whether the fruits of an illegal search motivated
application for search warrant); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604–05 (1975) (stating that
officers’ purposeful violation of Fourth Amendment is a factor in determining whether a
subsequently obtained confession is admissible). See also supra Section I.B.
256
See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604–05.
257
See id.
258
See sources cited supra notes 139–148 and discussion for summary of case.
259
See sources cited supra notes 139–148 and discussion for summary of case.
260
See sources cited supra notes 124–127 and accompanying discussion.
261
See sources cited supra notes 124–127 and accompanying discussion.
262
447 U.S. 727 (1980).
263
Id. at 729–31; see also Steiker, supra note 216 at 2509–10 (arguing that “[t]he
strictness of the current standing regime makes it much more likely that cases will arise in
255

2. SEKHON

98

4/6/2017 7:02 PM

SEKHON

[Vol. 107

principles only permit individuals whose privacy has been infringed to
move for exclusion of the unconstitutionally seized evidence.264 In Payner,
that was the banker, not defendant Payner.265 The Court permitted the
evidence’s admission despite the agents’ egregiously deliberate
constitutional violation.
On both the conduct rule and decision rule fronts, objective purpose
holds sway. But in neither context is the Court transparent about what the
expression means or what analytical work it is doing. One must mine
deeper for answers to those questions.
3. Accounting for Objective Purpose
The transactional framing266 of criminal procedure disputes makes it
easy to confuse police officers’ status as individuals and state agents. This
section demonstrates that objective purpose is a rhetorical device for
managing the tension between individual and state purpose in Fourth
Amendment cases.
a. Individual Versus State Purpose
The Court’s reliance on purpose reflects not only the concept’s
centrality to our notions of moral and legal responsibility, but also the
extent to which most Fourth Amendment disputes are framed as
transactional. In the typical case, the locus of inquiry is the point of contact
between an individual police officer and an individual citizen. This
litigation posture leads the typical Fourth Amendment dispute to feel like a
private dispute even though it is not. In private disputes between
individuals, the moment preceding the parties’ encounter serves as a
baseline for whether there was harm.267 And the putative wrongdoer’s state
of mind (or negligence) determines responsibility for that harm.268 That an
officer is investigating or enforcing particular criminal laws in a particular
place, however, is not a simple matter of personal choice. Departmental
directive determines his assignment to a particular beat, unit, and perhaps

which law enforcement agents can exploit the fact that the “target” of their investigation will
lack standing to contest searches and seizures designed to obtain evidence against him or
her,” and discussing Payner as an example).
264
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 136–38 (1978).
265
See Payner, 447 U.S. at 735.
266
I have borrowed the expression from Daryl Levinson. Levinson, supra note 23.
267
Id. at 1319.
268
Id.
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even his focus on specific kinds of crime or suspects.269 Notions of
individual purpose fail to adequately capture those dynamics.
Purpose has unique cultural and philosophical salience in defining
conceptions of public and private morality. Justice Holmes’s adage that
“even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being
kicked,”270 says less about dogs’ moral acuity than it does about humans’
preoccupation with typologizing intentionality.271 That preoccupation finds
expression in (and is, in turn, reaffirmed by) law and philosophy. The law
generally forbids kicking others, but often permits stumbling into them.
Common law categories of criminal and tort liability turn upon distinctions
between intentional, foreseeable, and purely accidental acts.272 Philosophers
have long been preoccupied with identifying the moral bases for these
distinctions.273 Many have offered various defenses for the intuition,274
although recent scholarship questions its normative plausibility.275
Even if there is a plausible distinction to be drawn between intentional
and foreseeable conduct for individuals, it cannot be extrapolated to the
State. David Enoch has recently argued that doing so is incorrect because
states are “artificial” agents that cannot be analogized to real human
beings.276 State institutions are comprised of multiple individuals who
collaborate (or compete) to make collective choices through what are often
complex decision-making processes.277 Enoch also argues against “taking
the state out of the picture altogether and focusing instead on the mental
states of the []real, natural, individual[] decision-makers.”278 Such
269

Sekhon, supra note 52, at 1186–91.
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272
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See id. at 71–72.
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See id.
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See id. at 85–86.
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They are capable of behaving in fundamentally inconsistent ways that cannot be
analogized to real persons. See Philip Pettit, Akrasia, Collective and Individual, in
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Tappolet eds., 2003).
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individuals are acting in their capacities as state officials, not as natural
individuals. They may be vested with special authority not of their own
making and be required to behave in ways that are impermissible in their
capacities as real, natural individuals. This is certainly true of police
officers.
The distinction between intention and foresight also falters with regard
to the states’ choices because, unlike with private individuals, there is no
readily identifiable baseline for measuring fault and harm. The common
law’s transactional framing of disputes is unhelpful because it creates a
baseline to measure harm and fault by isolating the moment just before one
party ran afoul of the other.279 Using that baseline to judge state conduct—
particularly, its constitutionality—ignores the fact that the state’s acts and
omissions have always already run afoul of someone. Put differently,
policymaking requires that the state make cost-cost tradeoffs.280 The state’s
choice to regulate particular conduct will typically rearrange an existing
pattern of costs and benefits. Similarly, electing not to regulate ratifies an
existing distribution of benefits and burdens. Sunstein and Vermeule
illustrate the dynamic using the death penalty.281 If it actually deters
homicides, then any choice the state might make about permitting or
prohibiting it will result in lives lost, it is just a question of whose lives.
While the example is fraught, the basic insight applies to most any context
in which the state has the power to regulate.282
The transactional framing of most Fourth Amendment cases confuses
the line between individual and state purpose analysis.283 Even more than
other areas of constitutional law,284 criminal procedure cases rely upon
transactional framing. Fourth Amendment questions typically arise in
connection with individual criminal cases, not as broad structural
challenges to law enforcement practices. Often enough, officers are direct
participants in the criminal transaction. For example, in many narcotics
cases an undercover police buyer initiates the illegal transaction. Even when
the officer is not directly involved in the transaction that creates criminal
liability, she is often intimately bound up with it: whether by directly
observing the misconduct or its immediate aftermath, aiding victims, taking
279

See Levinson, supra note 23.
See id. at 1378.
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Cass Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts,
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See id.
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statements at the scene, and so on. This lends to framing Fourth
Amendment disputes as dramatic, oppositional encounters between
individuals. Not coincidentally, “cops and robbers” is law school slang for
the criminal procedure course focusing on the Fourth Amendment.
But the modern police officer is not an individual in the ordinary
sense. Police officers are state actors who are embedded in hierarchical,
bureaucratic structures that enable and constrain their behavior through
mandates, rules, and personnel policy.285 The discretion that police officers
do enjoy is wielded for public, not personal gain.
b. Objective Purpose Mediates Between Individual and Corporate
Conceptions of Police Officers.
By casting its Fourth Amendment purpose inquiry as objective, the
Court simultaneously invokes the deeply familiar, individualized concept of
purpose and disavows it.286 Objective purpose is a rhetorical device for
attributing a corporate, state purpose to individual officers. Implicitly, that
is to conceive of individual officers as “the state” when interacting with
suspects in the field. The state, however, is not unitary. It does not make
sense to equate officers with the state vis-à-vis courts. Accordingly, in the
limited instances when an officer has directly perpetrated a hoax on a court,
the Court seems more willing to permit scrutiny of an officer’s subjective,
individual motivations.
The Court’s notion of objective purpose implicitly casts individual
officers as the state personified vis-à-vis citizens.287 It does this by
attributing any legitimate basis that the state might have had for the search
or seizure to the individual officer. In most contexts, the Court has deemed
it irrelevant that an illegitimate motive led a particular officer to search or
seize so long as any other police officer could have legitimately engaged in
the same search or seizure.288 This analysis tracks that of a hypothetical
magistrate ex ante. Assume that the actual officer had an opportunity to
apply for a warrant and did so. If the applying officer made a factual error
in the application—for example, incorrectly thinking that probable cause
existed because of fact X when, in actuality, it existed because of fact Y—
this would not prevent the magistrate from issuing a warrant so long as she
was made aware of fact Y. Similarly, an officer’s misidentification of the
285
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relevant law would not prevent the magistrate from concluding that there
was probable cause to believe some other crime had been committed. This
is, in effect, to impute a legal rationale to the investigating officer if any
such rationale is available based upon all observable facts and applicable
criminal laws. This is true even if, subjectively speaking, nothing other than
the investigating officer’s illegitimate motivation accounted for her
conduct.289
The Court’s objective purpose inquiry, in effect, evaluates individual
officer’s choices as coextensive with the state’s broad discretion to enforce
criminal law. The jurisprudence is less calibrated to developing specific
conduct rules for officers than it is to roughly defining the outer bounds of
the state’s investigation and enforcement discretion. For example, criminal
procedure permits any officer to search or seize any time there is probable
cause to think that an individual has violated any criminal law.290 There are
countless criminal laws that apply to a vast range of human conduct.291 This
creates vast enforcement opportunities for the state and, by extension,
police officers.292 Even when an officer violates a constitutional conduct
rule, criminal procedure permits exclusion only if there is but-for cause
linking that officer’s conduct to the evidence seized.293 If some other state
agent, behaving constitutionally, would have discovered the same evidence,
it is admissible.294 The officer’s individual constitutional obligations
dissolve into the state’s corporate ones.
The big exception seems to be where officers directly perpetrate a
hoax upon a court by, for example, lying on a warrant application. The
Supreme Court seems more willing to permit exploration of their subjective
intentions in these situations.295 Because the state is not unitary, it makes
little sense to treat officers as the state embodied when they are seeking the
court’s authorization to search or seize. In these circumstances, the Court
treats them more akin to individuals and is more willing to delve into their
minds’ subjective workings. The Court has made clear that purposeful or
even reckless misrepresentations of fact in a warrant application will
invalidate a subsequent search.

289

See sources cited supra notes 52–65 and discussion.
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This willingness to scrutinize subjective officer intent in these
situations finds parallels in other criminal procedure contexts where state
agents may have perpetrated a hoax upon a court. For example, the Fifth
Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause permits courts to scrutinize
prosecutor’s subjective motives to assess whether she “intended to ‘goad’
the defendant into moving for a mistrial.”296 Where she has, double
jeopardy forecloses subsequent retrial.297 The Court’s willingness to
scrutinize subjective intentions where judicial process is concerned likely
owes something to judgments about institutional competence. Courts may
be better equipped to undertake subjective state-of-mind analyses where it
pertains to in-court misconduct. This pragmatic account, however, is not
theoretically satisfying. Nor does it entirely capture the Court’s willingness
to evaluate subjective motivations.
The more it seems that police officers are deliberately perpetrating a
hoax upon the courts, the more amenable the Supreme Court is to
considering their subjective intentions. For example, in Missouri v.
Seibert,298 the Court paid close attention to officers’ subjective intentions
without being entirely forthright that it was doing so. In Seibert, the Court
concluded that officers violated the defendant’s Miranda rights by engaging
in a two-phase interrogation.299 In the first phase, officers extracted a
confession without having Mirandized Seibert.300 In the second phase, the
officers Mirandized Seibert and then asked her to reiterate the confession.301
The interrogation tactic appeared to have been based upon a strategic
reading of the Court’s earlier decision in Elstad v. Oregon.302 In that case an
officer inadvertently questioned (and obtained a confession from) the
suspect prior to Mirandizing him.303 After Mirandizing the suspect, the
officer then obtained a second confession.304 The Court held that the
Miranda warning, in effect, cured the officer’s initial error—that is,
recitation of the Miranda warning was sufficient to apprise the suspect of

296
297
298
299
300
300
301
302
303
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Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).
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his rights and allow him to make an intelligent choice regarding waiver
despite his already having confessed once.305
Although the structure of the interrogation in Seibert was identical to
that in Elstad, the big difference was that the officers in Seibert deliberately
elicited the first confession. This was not lost on the Court in Seibert,
although the plurality was loathe to make the point explicitly. The plurality
reasoned that the police tactic was unconstitutional because it “effectively
threaten[ed] to thwart Miranda’s purpose.”306 Concurring, Justice Kennedy
called the interrogation a “deliberate violation of Miranda,” and wrote that
there should be a remedy for any tactic that “was used in a calculated way
to undermine the Miranda warning.”307
Officer duplicity vis-à-vis courts raise obvious difficulties in a divided
state. An officer stratagem to circumvent constitutional restraint à la Seibert
undermines not only judicial authority, but also the underlying point that
the constitutional rule is supposed to serve. The latter, of course, is
generally true whenever police officers deliberately circumvent
constitutional principles. While the Court seems to, at least implicitly,
recognize this problem, it has not built a jurisprudence that meaningfully
addresses it.
The Court’s use of objective purpose analysis obfuscates the nature of
police officers’ public role by falsely suggesting an analogy to mens rea or
negligence. In fact, the notion awkwardly mediates the tension between the
individual and corporate conceptualizations of officers.
B. UNDERSTANDING PROGRAMMATIC PURPOSE

The special needs and administrative exception cases oblige the Court
to more directly address state purpose because they involve institutional
decisionmaking. In those cases, the Court employs what it terms
programmatic-purpose analysis.308 Programmatic purpose is best
understood as a metaphor for the broad policy impulses that animate state
decisionmaking—more colloquially, a policy’s underlying point or goal.
Section 1 below suggests that this understanding of purpose has deep
resonances with constitutional means-ends testing.
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Section 2 demonstrates that programmatic purpose is substantially
underdeveloped in comparison to means-ends testing in other constitutional
contexts. This is because the Court has refused to define whether criminal
law enforcement is an end or a means. In addition, the Court has not
consistently used the principle of fit in those cases where analysis is called
for. Nor has the Court devoted sufficient attention to what the Fourth
Amendment requires of the relationship between a particular institution’s
purpose and the individual agents who are responsible for advancing that
purpose in the field.
1. Purpose is a Method for Reviewing Institutional Choice
While purpose evokes a state-of-mind analysis in criminal and tort
law, the concept also has deep purchase as a device for understanding
public institutions’ choices.309 The Court appears to recognize as much
when it appends “programmatic” to qualify purpose analysis in the special
needs and administrative exception cases.310
There is a relationship—although not entirely felicitous—between
these two distinct notions of purpose. We often imagine the state as if it
were a large individual that possesses intentions analogous to those of a real
person. Scholars have criticized such a conception for reasons noted
above.311 Nor should institutional choices be reduced to the aggregation of
constituent decisionmakers’ individual intentions.312 Even if empirically
possible to identify each individual’s actual intentions, aggregating them
will often fail to produce a coherent portrait of institutional purpose. For
example, legislation scholars have long recognized that wildly disparate
motivations may account for individual legislators’ choices with regard to a
particular bill.313 In addition, deliberative processes have the capacity to
generate internally inconsistent results.314 This means that an institutional
actor cannot behave with the kind of “rational unity” that philosophers
would expect of an “intentional agent.”315
But corporate entities still can act pursuant to a general plan or towards
a rough goal. To be intelligible as policy, there has to be some reasonably
309
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clear answer to the question, “What is the point?” Were it otherwise, liberal
governance would impossible. The liberal state is, by definition, one that is
both reasonably responsive to its constituents’ desires and subject to
constitutional principles of justice.316 The state must have the capacity to act
in ways that constituents can identify and challenge. All of this presupposes
some kind of shared political vocabulary and some reasonably specific state
goals to agree or disagree about.317
Liberal theories of the state are preoccupied with identifying the kinds
of goals that the state might legitimately pursue and the constraints they
may be subject to. For example, in John Rawls’ formulation, a liberal state
may legitimately pursue majoritarian ends subject to libertarian and
distributive restrictions.318 These principles of justice both restrict the range
of legitimate goals that the state may pursue and the methods by which
those legitimate goals might be advanced.319 These constraints on state ends
and means have deep resonance in our constitutional jurisprudence.
“Means-ends testing” is a staple of constitutional jurisprudence. It
requires the Court to evaluate the “fit” between a state’s legitimate goals
and the method that it uses to advance those goals.320 The degree of fit
required varies depending upon the nature of the goal. Roughly speaking,
the more legitimate the goal, the more leeway the state has to pursue it. The
more constitutionally suspect the goal, the less leeway the state has to
pursue it.
For example, the First Amendment severely limits the state’s ability to
regulate “protected speech.”321 For less constitutionally significant
categories of speech—lewd speech or fraud, for instance—the state enjoys
considerably more leeway to regulate.322 To the extent that the state restricts
protected speech in the course of pursuing some other legitimate goal—for
example, banning depictions of animal cruelty in order to forestall future
animal cruelty323—it must demonstrate that it employed the “least
316
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restrictive means” to do so.324 The state cannot limit any more speech than
is absolutely necessary to accomplish its legitimate goal.325 This prevents
both pretextual state behavior and sloppiness.
Equal protection analysis is similar. There are some goals that the state
may not pursue at all: for example, racial segregation for its own sake.
Where the state distributes benefits or burdens based upon a suspect
classification, such as race, to accomplish some other ostensibly legitimate
goal, such as preventing fights in prison,326 the goal must be exceedingly
important.327 The Court evaluates the state’s proffered goal with “strict
scrutiny” in order to root out pretext.328 Where the state relies upon a
suspect classification, strict scrutiny review virtually presumes that any
nonracial goal is pretextual.329 Even if a state’s goal is compelling,
however, the Court also evaluates whether the suspect classification is
“narrowly tailored” to accomplish the goal.330 This onerous standard
requires the state to show that it did not rely on race any more than
necessary to accomplish its exceedingly important goal.331
In contrast, state practices rarely fail to satisfy the less rigorous
rational-basis review.332 When the state distributes benefits or burdens on
the basis of a nonsuspect classification without impinging upon any
fundamental right, the Court only requires that the classification be
rationally related to a legitimate goal.333 States, for example, have broad
discretion to distribute taxation’s benefits and burdens as they see fit.334 The
Court usually reviews the state’s purpose for bare plausibility, sometimes
accepting post hoc rationales or supplying them itself.335 For legislative
324
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acts, there is no obligation that the legislature itself have articulated the
rationale for the challenged policy.336 And the fit between means and ends
need not be particularly tight; the state’s conduct just cannot be
“irrational.”337
2. Programmatic Purpose is Stunted Means-Ends Testing
The Court’s programmatic purpose is a form of means-ends testing. It
is, however, considerably underdeveloped in comparison to the tiered
system of review used in other constitutional contexts.338 The Court has
held that open-ended interest balancing for reasonableness is permissible
when an agency’s primary purpose is other than ordinary crime control.339
If the goal is ordinary crime control, the Fourth Amendment requires
individualized suspicion.340 The Court, however, has not advanced a
principle for distinguishing when (or whether) criminal enforcement is an
“end” and when it is a “means.” The Court has permitted interest balancing
in cases in which law enforcement has used criminal enforcement as a
means to achieve some ostensibly noncriminal end.341 In addition, the Court
has not developed clear rules of fit between means and ends where a state’s
primary purpose is noncriminal.
The Court’s special needs and administrative exception cases turn on
whether the state’s primary purpose was crime control. For example, in
Edmond, Indianapolis stated that its goal in erecting a vehicle roadblock
was interdicting illegal drugs.342 This made it easy for the Court to conclude
that the roadblock’s primary purpose was ordinary crime control without
having to offer guidance on how to distinguish between primary and
secondary purposes. 343 In Ferguson, the Court suggested that the distinction
between primary and secondary purposes is a distinction between
“ultimate” and “immediate” goals.344 There, a state hospital forwarded
provide a rational basis for the classification” (quoting FCC v. Beach Commc’n, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313 (1993))).
336
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337
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338
See supra Section II.B.1.
339
See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41–42 (2001).
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evidence that pregnant women were addicted to cocaine to law
enforcement.345 While the state’s ultimate goal in Ferguson might have
“been to get the [cocaine-addicted] women in question into substance abuse
treatment and off of drugs, the immediate objective of the searches was to
generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that
goal.”346 Ferguson suggests that when criminal enforcement is used as a
means for achieving a noncriminal goal, the standard requirements of
individualized suspicion apply.347 Otherwise, special needs would swallow
all of criminal procedure “[b]ecause [criminal] law enforcement
involvement always serves some broader social purpose or
objective . . . .”348
The distinction between immediate and ultimate goals drawn in
Ferguson, however, does not sit comfortably with the Court’s holding in
New York v. Burger or in earlier roadblock cases.349 In both MartinezFuerte and Sitz, roadblock cases predating Ferguson, the Court approved
the suspicionless roadblocks for ostensibly noncriminal purposes—
preventing undocumented migration and drunk driving, respectively.350 But
the state relied upon criminal law enforcement to advance both of those
policy purposes.351 A police department or most other state actors are
unlikely to describe criminal law enforcement as valuable for its own sake.
Such enforcement usually advances some broader, underlying policy
goal.352
In Burger, the Court permitted the warrantless search of a junkyard for
evidence of stolen cars pursuant to a New York state statute that authorized
police officers to conduct “administrative inspections.”353 The Court
concluded that the legislature’s purpose was administrative, not criminal.354
alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 560–61
(1976))).
345
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346
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347
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349
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See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21.
350
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The Court understood the inspection statute’s goal as reducing the
economic harms associated with auto theft.355 Of course, the same might
have been said about criminal statutes punishing auto theft.356 The
administrative inspection statute itself made it a crime to refuse to cooperate
with the police.357 The police could also use evidence seized in the so-called
administrative search in a theft case against the individual whose business
was subjected to administrative search.358 That is exactly what the state did
when it prosecuted Burger.359 The opinion suggests that there is nothing
problematic about using criminal means to pursue noncriminal ends.360
Similarly, in cruel-and-unusual-punishment and double-jeopardy
cases, the Court has refused to characterize criminal punishment as a means
or ends. Rather than squarely addressing what “criminal” means, the Court
has deferred to legislative labels.361 This, with few exceptions, has been true
even in cases where the state has used the “civil” label to describe harsh,
custodial practices that most laypersons would think of as criminal.362 The
notion that criminal punishment is an end is deeply retributive. By this
view, criminal law exists so that the state may inflict suffering upon a
blameworthy person in strict proportion to the moral wrong the
blameworthy person has done.363 By a utilitarian view, criminal punishment
is a kind of super-deterrent that might be used to achieve any number of
public policy ends.364 The Court resisted the conclusion that the
355
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Constitution does not require legislatures to choose among these or any of
the other available rationales for criminalizing conduct.365 While federalism
concerns may weigh in favor of deferring to legislative prerogatives, the
same is not true for police departments’ choices. The Court, however, does
not seem poised to scrutinize the latter’s choices more vigorously.
Even if it were clear whether criminal enforcement was means or ends,
questions of how to judge fit between the two would remain. King
highlights the broad questions that remain outstanding. The reasonableness
balancing in King is redolent of the least stringent version of rational basis
review. The Court credited what appeared to be incidental reasons—if not
entirely hypothetical ones—for the DNA testing policy. In assessing
Maryland’s goals, the Court assiduously avoided any reference to the most
obvious (and likely actual) reason for Maryland’s DNA collection practices.
The statute’s preamble indicated that the state had authorized DNA
collection in order to solve past crimes.366 Notwithstanding, the Court
upheld the practice’s constitutionality based upon what it identified as the
state’s administrative goal in properly identifying arrestees.367 This
outweighed the minimally intrusive cheek swab by which police collected
arrestees’ genetic material.368 In previous special needs cases, the Court
paid considerably more attention to the state’s actual reasons for carrying
out the searches. 369
While the Court has never required that the state use the least
restrictive means to accomplish its special need,370 it has generally required
that those needs be more than hypothetical. For example, in Skinner,
suspicionless drug testing was limited to those railroad employees in safetysensitive positions.371 A review of railroad accidents triggered the testing
requirement.372 In addition, there was evidence to suggest that intoxication
on the job was a problem.373 Similarly in Acton, there was an actual drug
use problem in the school district, and evidence suggested that student
athletes were driving it.374 While there was no evidence of an actual drug

365
366
367
368
369
370
371
372
373
374

E.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25 (plurality opinion).
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1985 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1970.
Id. at 1977–78.
See supra Section I.C.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 629 n.9 (1989).
Id. at 620.
Id. at 607–08.
Id. at 606–07.
Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648−49 (1995).
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use problem among Treasury employees in Von Raab,375 the Court
determined that suspicionless drug testing was permissible for those
employees in specific, security-sensitive positions.376 In none of the three
cases was there any suggestion that the state’s purpose for suspicionless
drug testing was securing convictions.377 King is to the contrary; indeed,
King was convicted after being tied to an unsolved case by his DNA.378
To summarize the disarray: a special-needs search is permitted where
an institution’s primary goal is noncriminal. But the institution can use
criminal means to achieve its noncriminal goal. Further, the Court is
agnostic as to whether criminal punishment is means or ends.
Notwithstanding, the Court will sometimes scrutinize the fit between means
and ends vigorously to ensure that criminal means have not subsumed a
noncriminal end. Other times though, the Court will not scrutinize fit with
any vigor at all. The Court has not announced when it will do the former
and when it will do the latter.
3. The Relationship Between Institutional Purpose and Officer
Purpose is Murky
The disarray surrounding Fourth Amendment regulation of
institutional choice is compounded by lack of guidance on what steps
institutions must take to ensure that their individual agents effect a noncrime-control programmatic purpose. This is the problem of pretext. The
question is most pressing for police agencies and officers because the power
to make a criminal arrest is a background fact regardless of what the
department’s primary programmatic goal may be. Even if one could neatly
define a legislature’s or police department’s purpose as civil, it is not clear
why or how that would map onto individual police officers’ motivations in
a particular situation. While the Court has made veiled allusions to the
dangers of pretext in such cases,379 it has not developed principles to
forestall their realization. Burger is illustrative.
375

Justice Scalia emphasized this point in his dissent in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 682, 685−86 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
376
Id. at 677 (majority opinion). The case was remanded for fact finding regarding
other, nonsecurity related positions covered by the suspicionless drug testing requirement.
Id. at 678.
377
See id. at 663 (showing test results not transmitted to prosecutor); see also Acton,
515 U.S. at 651 (suggesting the same). In Skinner, there was no prohibition on forwarding
results to law enforcement, but no evidence that that had happened. 489 U.S. at 621 n.5.
378
Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013).
379
See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987); Colorado v. Bertine,
479 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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In Burger, police officers were charged with executing the
administrative search authorized by the New York legislature. The
legislature created the scheme to deter auto theft.380 Because this deterrence
regime was designed to achieve the same goal that underlies criminal laws
prohibiting auto theft, it is questionable that there could be any neat
distinction between criminal and administrative purposes in this setting.381
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the search was administrative, not
criminal.382 The opinion implies that the officers’ purpose in carrying out
the suspicionless search was continuous with the legislature’s purpose in
creating the statute.383 Whether that was actually true is questionable.384 The
Court stated that if officers come across evidence of “crimes in the course
of an otherwise proper administrative inspection” that evidence is
admissible to convict.385 It is unclear what “otherwise proper” means. Is it
enough that the officers are acting pursuant to legislative authorization, or
must the officers’ purpose actually be consistent with the legislature’s
purpose?
Similarly, the Court has approved roadblock searches without
specifying what, if any, alignment there must be between the department’s
and an individual officer’s intentions. Recall that in Martinez-Fuerte and
Sitz, the Court approved suspicionless roadblocks for ostensibly
noncriminal, public policy purposes—preventing undocumented
immigration and drunk driving, respectively.386 In both cases there were
criminal laws prohibiting the conduct. Officers subjected motorists to more
intensive, secondary searches based upon information gleaned in the initial,
suspicionless search.387 The Court has suggested that the initial,
suspicionless searches should be conducted according to a protocol that
minimizes the discretion exercised by the individual officers staffing the
checkpoint.388 Beyond that, however, the Court has not indicated whether
the Fourth Amendment imposes any additional constraints upon officer
380

See Burger, 482 U.S. at 698.
The dissenters in Burger hinted at this very conclusion. See id. at 728 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
382
Id. at 712 (majority opinion).
383
See id. at 717 (“So long as a regulatory scheme is properly administrative, it is not
rendered illegal by the fact that the inspecting officer has the power to arrest individual for
violation other than those created by the scheme itself.”).
384
See id. at 694 n.2.
385
Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
386
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976).
387
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450–51; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 549–50.
388
See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 559.
381
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discretion than would ordinarily apply. If individual officers understand
their jobs to be making arrests,389 they might view a roadblock as an
opportunity to do so regardless of the department’s official statement of
purpose. For example, officers staffing a roadblock might aggressively use
Terry stops or consent to maximize secondary searches and arrests.390 In
Edmond, the state made it easy for the Court to conclude that the
roadblock’s primary purpose was criminal by conceding that it was set up
for drug interdiction.391 Had the department described the roadblock’s
purpose as “keeping drug-addled drivers off the road,” it might have
seemed analogous to the constitutional drunk-driving checkpoint in Sitz.392
Such rebranding likely would not have dissuaded individual officers from
making just as many narcotics arrests at the checkpoint.
Even when the Court has explicitly recognized that an institutional
practice may be rife with opportunities for individual agents to behave
pretextually, it has not imposed serious constraints. For example, in
Colorado v. Bertine, a three-justice concurrence recognized that the
inventory search exception is problematic because it creates opportunities
for police officers to pretextually search for evidence of criminal
wrongdoing.393 To prevent this from occurring, the concurrence indicated
that inventory searches should be conducted pursuant to departmental
regulations that prescribe when and how such searches are to be carried
out.394 In subsequent cases, however, the Court clarified that such
regulations could leave considerable discretion to individual officers.395
Much like in the roadblock context, the Court has created an incentive for
departments to create some sort of general policy, but not necessarily to
actually restrain officer discretion.
Scrutinizing the intersection of institutional and individual purposes in
the special needs or administrative contexts might strike the Court as a
slippery slope. Other traditional crime-control cases could readily be recast
as disputes about the disjuncture between programmatic purpose and
389

See Sekhon, supra note 52, at 1207–08 (describing how N.Y.P.D. encouraged
officers to view their responsibility in terms of making arrests).
390
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court authorized police officers to make brief investigatory
stops based upon reasonable suspicion, which is a less stringent standard than probable
cause. 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). Police may also conduct a brief pat down for weapons in
connection with a Terry stop. Id. at 27.
391
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–41 (2000).
392
See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451–52.
393
See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
394
Id.
395
See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990).
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individual officers’ choices. In Whren, for instance, there was a
departmental policy limiting the circumstances in which undercover officers
could make traffic stops.396 The primary, programmatic purpose for creating
a specialized, undercover narcotics unit was presumably to enforce
narcotics, not traffic, laws. The policy evinced a departmental intention
with regard to both ends and means. Similarly, in a case like Jardines, it
seems appropriate to assume that the primary, programmatic purpose of a
narcotics K-9 unit is to identify criminal narcotics violations. Anytime the
officer uses the narcotics dog, one might assume that the officer’s
individual purpose was to advance the programmatic purpose. It would be
strange for a K-9 officer to approach someone’s front door with the dog and
claim that her primary purpose was community caretaking.397 Neither in
Whren or otherwise, however, has the Court been willing to create a Fourth
Amendment remedy for officers’ failure to behave in ways required by
local or state institutions.398
The critique implicit throughout Section B has been that the Court is
insufficiently vigorous in its Fourth Amendment means-ends testing. The
Court does not consistently require institutions to be clear about their goals
or how to achieve them. Nor does it require such institutions to prevent
their agents from behaving pretextually when implementing a noncriminal
programmatic purpose. The latter is most troubling when the agents are
police officers. These problems cannot be solved by doctrinal reform alone.
C. THE PRAGMATIST’S REBUKE

Section II’s core arguments are vulnerable to pragmatist objection. At
the most general level, the discussion’s overarching criticism has been that
the Court has failed to adequately develop a Fourth Amendment framework
for analyzing state purpose. The pragmatist might counter that doing so is
unimportant because Fourth Amendment doctrine has so little impact on
police officers. By this view, evidentiary issues, equity concerns with
remedy, and judges’ dispositions will have greater bearing on suppression
outcomes than any Fourth Amendment test.
Answering whether a constitutional violation occurred will often turn
on factual questions. Given this structural reality, one might wonder how
much difference it makes whether the standard for evaluating purpose is
objective, subjective, or something else. The court’s legal conclusions will
turn on the same facts regardless of the standard and it will usually be
396
397
398

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406 (2006).
See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008).
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officers and suspects that supply those facts. Unlike most suspects, police
officers are credible and experienced witnesses. They have typically had
some practice conforming their observations and recollections to the
relevant legal standard.399 Courts are likely inclined to credit their
testimony.400 Even when this is not true, courts may be willing to overlook
officer deception because “letting the criminal go free” seems like too high
a cost to pay for constitutional rectitude.401
Similarly, one might think that adopting a more formalized meansends test in the special needs and administrative exceptions contexts would
make little difference to case outcomes. From a formalist’s standpoint, it
might be more seemly if the Fourth Amendment’s means-ends lexicon
conformed to that deployed in other constitutional contexts. While the
Court might win some transparency points for explicitly naming its
interpretive practice, this would not necessarily make for any change in
outcomes. Tiered review in other constitutional contexts has not led to
predictable and consistent results.402 Commentators have assailed the
Court’s distinctions between strict, intermediate, and rational-basis
review,403 some suggesting that these complex gradations actually create
cover for the Court to behave in ad hoc ways.404
Pragmatist critique counsels against imagining normative upshot in
terms of doctrinal change. But the normative implications of the discussion
in Section II need not be imagined in doctrinal terms alone. Rather, a fuller
more consistent framework for evaluating purpose would likely impel
significant structural reform. The next section explains why.
III. PURPOSE AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
What would a fully developed Fourth Amendment framework for
evaluating state purpose look like? The normative account that follows is
offered as an ideal of liberal constitutionalism, not as a recipe for near-term
399
Cf. Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1037, 1041–42 (1996) (discussing the “systematic,” “routine,”
“commonplace,” and “prevalent” practice of “testilying,” or police perjury to effect a
conviction).
400
See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 349.
401
See id. at 350.
402
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Plessy, Brown, and Grutter: A Play in Three Acts, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 1689, 1718 (2005) (discussing the “doctrinal[] awkward[ness]” of Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003)).
403
See sources cited supra notes 320–337 and accompanying discussion.
404
See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 320–337 and accompanying discussion; see also
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 493–94 (2004).
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doctrinal reform. It endeavors to give full expression to the radical
consequences of the preceding analysis.
Fourth Amendment purpose has greater conceptual potential as an ex
ante regulatory principle than as a post hoc principle of judicial review in
individual cases. Doing so would help ensure that enforcement
bureaucracies fairly and transparently calibrate the coercion their agents
wield to achieve clearly defined goals. This is to embrace a means-ends
conception of purpose.405 Simply importing a means-ends test from another
constitutional law context, however, is unlikely to be helpful. As the
discussion above suggests, judicial review is ill equipped to sort and
identify the entangled motivations that often impel institutional and
individual enforcement choices.406
This section argues that purpose should be used as a regulatory
principle for directly addressing mandate sprawl. Institutional responsibility
for specific enforcement goals should be parceled precisely, and specific
conduct rules for individual agents should flow from that purposive division
of labor. This might mean stripping police departments of responsibility for
noncriminal enforcement actions. For example, to the extent that a
suspicionless DUI roadblock’s primary purpose is removing drunk drivers
from the road, perhaps the DMV or some other entity without arrest
authority ought to operate them. Similar parceling should occur within
police departments so that different internal procedures apply to different
categories of criminal enforcement based upon coerciveness—for example,
issuing speeding tickets is significantly less coercive than making narcotics
arrests.
While there is an important role for courts in developing and
implementing a purposive division of enforcement labor, that role would be
quite different from the one that courts currently play in typical Fourth
Amendment suppression motions.407
If purpose is to function as an effective regulatory tool and remain true
to its origins in liberal political theory, purpose must do two related things.
Each is taken up in Sections A and B respectively.

405

See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 320–337 and accompanying discussion;
Goldberg, supra note 404, at 493–94.
406
See supra Section II.B.3; see also Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110
MICH. L. REV. 761, 776 (2012) (arguing that judicial review is ill equipped to manage the
core tensions that lie at the heart of policing in democratic society).
407
See supra Section II.A.3(a). It would be an approach that focused to a considerably
lesser degree on individual rights. Cf. Harmon, supra note 406, at 776–81 (critiquing the role
of rights in regulating police).
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First, purpose should define permissible goals for police departments
with sufficient particularity to permit meaningful comparisons. If goals are
drawn too broadly, courts (or some other regulatory authority) cannot
properly calibrate procedural constraints—they will be under- and
overinclusive if too broad a range of state conduct is lumped together. The
flip side of the coin is a typology so particularized that it forecloses
meaningful comparisons between different incarnations of state coercion.
An approach that evaluates government coercion on the specific facts that
arise in individual cases might lose sight of constitutional values by getting
caught up with narrow, empirical questions implicated by those cases.408
Both problems currently beset Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
roughly hewn distinction between criminal and civil matters leads
procedural protections to be both over- and underinclusive. And the
transactional framing of disputes tends to obfuscate the broad institutional
concerns that Fourth Amendment purpose analysis should implicate.409
Second, purpose would also help minimize goal confusion and pretext.
The state should be truthful about the goals that it seeks to advance when
undertaking coercive action. For procedural constraints on state coercion to
function, it must be possible to identify the actual reasons impelling a
policy or practice. This requires that state actors be clear about their own
goals and be truthful in representing them to other state actors and the
public. This might be impossible for an institution that is responsible for too
many overlapping goals—a condition defined below as “goal confusion.”
Goal confusion and pretextual enforcement undermine efficient regulation,
frustrate constitutional review, and undermine constituents’ ability to
meaningfully challenge state enforcement practices. For example, voters
might feel a good bit more supportive of a state agency collecting biometric
data for the purpose of identifying the population’s vulnerability to a
particular disease than for national security surveillance. A properly liberal
state would not do the latter while claiming to do the former.
If understood and applied in a principled way, Fourth Amendment
purpose analysis would require significant restructuring of many
enforcement bureaucracies, particularly police departments. This would, in
turn have significant consequences for the regulation of individual state
agents. The Court is right to question the practicality of delving into
408

Jerry L. Mashaw made such a criticism of the Court’s procedural due process
framework. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46–49 (1976).
409
See sources cited supra Section II.A.3.
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individual officer’s subjective intentions each time a Fourth Amendment
issue arises.410 The discussion above has demonstrated, however, the
Court’s “objective” approach obfuscates the essential nature of Fourth
Amendment analysis.411 If enforcement bureaucracies were organized in
terms of narrowly delimited purposes, it would be much easier to
objectively review individual officers’ conduct. Individual conduct that
substantially deviated from the defined institutional mandate would be per
se unreasonable.
A. CRIMINAL IS OVER- AND UNDERINCLUSIVE

The Fourth Amendment imposes more stringent procedural restraints
on the government in criminal prosecutions than in civil enforcement
actions. As discussed, this creates incentives for an enforcement
bureaucracy to claim it is doing the latter when it is actually doing the
former.412 This is true despite the fact that the label criminal includes much
state conduct that is pretty mild and excludes much that is very harsh. The
criminal–civil binary has been the subject of extensive criticism
elsewhere,413 so only a brief account is provided here.
The government has been both profligate and parsimonious in using
the label criminal. Legislatures have made extensive use of criminal law as
a regulatory device, leading many scholars to complain of
overcriminalization.414 The proliferation of criminal laws means that trifling
misconduct can make one vulnerable to criminal punishment.415 Criminal
procedure, of course, governs the investigation of all those crimes. On the
other hand, the state treats a host of individuals quite harshly for conduct
that is not criminal. For example, the state routinely detains individuals
before criminal charges have been filed, undocumented immigrants pending
their removal from the United States, individuals civilly committed for
being dangerous to themselves or others, and so on.416 Criminal procedure
does not apply to such civil proceedings. The Court has readily deferred to
legislative labels even in circumstances where the label has seemed patently
inaccurate.417 This, in effect, cedes discretionary authority to legislatures
410

E.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
See supra Section II.A.3.
412
See supra Section II.B.3.
413
See supra Section II.B.3.
414
See, e.g., Erika Luna, The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703,
713, 713 n.49 (2005).
415
See id. at 713–14.
416
See sources cited supra notes 361–362 and discussion.
417
See sources cited supra notes 361–362 and discussion.
411
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and enforcement bureaucracies to strategically dodge criminal procedure’s
requirements by designating enforcement actions civil. The New York
junkyard inspection regulation at issue in Burger is a good example.418
Some scholars have suggested abandoning the binary entirely. For
example, Isachaar Rosen-Zvi and Talia Fisher have advocated for a caseby-case approach to determining procedural protections. They would leave
it to courts to determine the procedural protections that should apply in any
particular case based upon the relative power of the parties, the stakes of the
litigation, and so forth.419 Rosen-Zvi and Fisher are largely concerned with
one source of procedural protection alone, the burden of proof at trial.420
The ad hoc approach they prescribe may be useful in identifying the
procedures required for fair adjudication. It is not, however, helpful for
structuring fair enforcement action in advance of litigation. A more nuanced
and modulated approach is necessary and limned below.
Regulating enforcement activity requires firm categories ranked by
coerciveness so that appropriate procedural rules may be crafted ex ante.421
While the criminal–civil binary is probably too general to serve that
purpose effectively, a more detailed and graduated typology could. New
categories should reflect meaningful differences in the severity of the state’s
intrusiveness and potential consequences of that intrusiveness. Investigating
a seatbelt violation, for example, should not be subject to greater procedural
protections than an invasive home visit by a social worker.422
The identity and authority of the state agent should be an important
factor in tailoring procedural restraints upon that agent’s investigatory
power. A state actor that has the power to arrest or undertake other
comparably severe action should, other things being equal, be subject to
greater procedural restrictions than one that does not. These intuitions are
developed further in the section that follows.

418

See sources cited supra notes 380–385.
See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 31, at 84–87.
420
See id.
421
Contrary to Rosen-Zvi and Fisher, I am assuming that there will be no practical
opportunity for a neutral referee to consider the parties’ relative strength vis-à-vis one
another in advance of enforcement action.
422
See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317–18 (1971) (concluding that mandatory
home visit by case worker of state aid recipient was neither a search nor unreasonable).
419
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B. PRETEXT AND GOAL CONFUSION

Even if permissible goals are delimited finely, another problem
remains: Those goals must be parceled in a manner that limits “goal
confusion” and pretext.
A liberal state should transparently pursue goals.423 Unique
transparency challenges arise when the state vests an actor—whether
institution or individual—with responsibility for advancing a broad range of
goals. The state actor may claim to be pursuing one goal when it is actually
pursuing another. The incentives to do this will be particularly pronounced
where goals overlap with some subject to more stringent procedural
restrictions than others. If two goals overlap such that accomplishing one
goes reasonably far in accomplishing the other and the latter is more
procedurally “costly” to pursue, the state actor will have incentive to claim
that it is pursuing the former even if it is pursuing the latter. Returning to
Burger, the police will always have incentive to claim that they are
regulating junkyards even if punishing thieves was a significant goal.424
Teasing the two goals apart in advance of the search would have been
difficult since the legislature entangled them. When enforcement
bureaucracies are charged with entangled goals in this way, it will be
difficult if not impossible for the bureaucracy or its agents to honestly rank
goals for any practice or policy that advances them simultaneously—that is
to say, there will be goal confusion.425
Municipal police departments are particularly vulnerable to goal
confusion. They are tasked with a broad range of goals, many of which are
not even nominally criminal.426 As a consequence, municipal police
departments are often first responders for a host of social ills.427 This goal
proliferation carries over into individual officers’ responsibilities. But the
power to arrest always lurks in the background—the goal of getting a “good
collar” likely overlaps with each of the wide variety of other goals a patrol
officer is responsible for advancing in a given workday.428 It is no wonder
that courts have trouble distinguishing official justification from ulterior
motive in Fourth Amendment cases. At least some members of the Court
423

See supra Section II.B.1.
See sources cited supra notes 353−360 and accompanying discussion.
425
See supra Section II.B.2.
426
See, e.g., Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth
Amendment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 261 (1998).
427
See id. at 271–73.
428
For a detailed and intimate portrait of a patrol officer’s workday routines, see
CONLON, supra note 238, at 14−38.
424
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seem to recognize that pretext and goal confusion are problems.429 But it is
practically impossible for the court, post hoc, to disentangle and rank goals
that were entangled by design.
The beginning of a solution to pretext and goal confusion would be for
courts to simply assume that a state agent’s purpose is always that which
corresponds to the most severe brand of coercive authority she wields.
Under this approach, courts would just assume that police officers’ and
departments’ purpose is always to make arrests—even when they claim
otherwise in a particular case. This would mark a dramatic doctrinal shift.
Not only would it be easier for courts to apply than current formulations of
purpose analysis, it would create incentives for the state to disaggregate and
assign goals in institutionally appropriate ways. Such structural reform
would not only reduce pretext and goal confusion, it would make it easier
for courts to review individual and institutional state practices for either.430
The endgame would be a goal-delimited disaggregation of
enforcement bureaucracies. Section 1 below sketches the outlines of such
reform for criminal versus noncriminal goals.431 Section 2 does the same for
criminal goals based upon seriousness.
1. Purpose and Institutional Role
Disaggregating criminal from noncriminal police functions would help
make the motivations for police behavior more transparent. In Burger, for
instance, the fact that sworn police officers were responsible for carrying
out an ostensibly administrative search created a powerful appearance of
pretext. At the very least, there must have been goal confusion: the
administrative scheme’s goal of decreasing auto theft was coterminous with
that of criminal theft. Nonetheless, the Court explicitly rejected the

429

See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987); Bertine v. Colorado,
479 U.S. 367, 381 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
430
There may be a host of additional benefits. For example, Eric Miller has argued that
role-based regulation of policing (as distinguished from the current approach of rule-based
regulation) could bolster police legitimacy in minority neighborhoods. Eric Miller, RoleBased Policing: Restraining Police Conduct Outside the “Legitimate Investigative Sphere,”
94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 621, 643−44 (2006). Miller argues, for example, that different state
actors should be responsible for enforcing serious crimes as opposed to petty, ordermaintenance type infractions. Id. at 664−66. Nonsworn personnel might be more effective at
responding to the latter without engendering community resentment. Id.
431
“Criminal” is used here and through the remaining sections in a rough, colloquial
way as opposed to the more technical way that it was when discussion the criminal–civil
binary. See supra Section III.A.
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possibility of requiring the state to use nonsworn officers to carry out its
administrative scheme.432 It did so without any serious explanation.433
One can see the outlines for such an approach in some of the Court’s
earlier administrative search cases. For instance, in fire investigations, a
plurality of the Court subjected the state to higher procedural constraints
when its goal was identifying an arsonist as opposed to just identifying the
causes of the fire in order to prevent reoccurrence.434 Where the purpose of
a state investigation is identifying an individual for punishment, procedural
constraints should be stringent to ensure accuracy and minimize invasions
of privacy and liberty.435 But where the state’s purpose is to prevent future
reoccurrence, less stringent procedural standards are necessary because the
state’s purpose advances social good without posing a high threat to
individual liberty, privacy, or dignity.436 Where the investigator’s purpose is
the former, she must obtain a criminal warrant upon a showing of probable
cause.437 Where the investigator’s purpose is noncriminal, she must obtain
an administrative warrant, which requires a lesser showing.438 These two
functions may be intertwined in a fire inspection, but primary responsibility
for each will often fall upon a different actor’s shoulders—criminal
investigator versus fire inspector. That helps courts avoid tortured purpose
analysis. Similarly, in Camara, the Court held that building code inspectors
would be subject to less stringent procedural constraints than police officers
investigating a crime.439 Again, given the state’s goal, it makes sense that
procedural restrictions would be relatively more relaxed than would be true
for more potentially coercive state action like a criminal investigation. In
both cases, however, an institutional division of labor was already in place.
The Supreme Court would have done well to incentivize legislatures to
create more such divisions of labor. But in Burger, the Court passed on the
opportunity: “[W]e decline to impose upon the States the burden of
requiring the enforcement of their regulatory statutes to be carried out by
specialized agents.”440
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Had the Court done otherwise in Burger, one could imagine any
number of cases turning out differently. For example, the Court might have
refused to allow police-department-directed roadblocks. Limiting police
departments to the use of such tactics for a primary purpose other than
ordinary crime control is to invite goal confusion and pretextual
enforcement.441 The mechanism that a police department is likely to use at a
drunk driving roadblock is making arrests for violating criminal drunk
driving laws.442 Unless the department forbade officers from making arrests,
it is impossible to cabin the broad public policy goal of minimizing drunk
driving from the crime control mechanism that is used to advance it. A
better approach would be to charge an entirely different bureaucracy with
responsibility for advancing the public policy objective where this kind of
constitutional tension exists between means and ends. To the extent that a
roadblock’s goal is removing unsafe drivers from the road—this must be
the primary purpose for a suspicionless search at a DUI roadblock for it to
be constitutional443—perhaps it should be the Department of Motor
Vehicle’s duty to administer it. The DMV has the authority to suspend a
driver’s license, but not to make arrests.
Such purposive division of labor could also occur within an institution
by creating firewalls between different categories of state agents. For
example, in theory an inventory search is only permitted for the purpose of
protecting a police department from liability and from dangerous items.444
There is no reason why sworn officers should perform this function, let
alone those officers who made the decision to impound a particular vehicle.
Where an investigating officer has discretion to order a vehicle impounded
and is then permitted to engage in a thoroughgoing search of the vehicle
without probable cause, we should expect rational officers to use this
authority pretextually whenever efficient to do so. This is notwithstanding
that unsworn personnel could readily carry out inventory searches pursuant
to standardized rules without revealing the results to the investigating
officers or prosecutors.
Similarly, nonsworn personnel might be charged with responding to
community caretaking exigencies that do not appear to implicate any
criminal law violation. Lower procedural protections are defensible where
the state’s purpose for violating an individual’s privacy is to help her rather
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than to target her for criminal investigation.445 There are any number of
quotidian exigencies that might compel a state agent to violate an
individual’s privacy or liberty interest: entering someone’s home to prevent
death or serious injury;446 forcibly administering narcotics overdose
medication or seizing narcotics that might cause an overdose;447 or even
removing agitated bees from an urban beekeeper’s tenement hives.448 These
are circumstances where we might expect state agents to intervene—and
there is a powerful liberal rationale for requiring lower procedural restraints
upon such interventions in comparison to those designed to identify
criminal wrongdoing.449 It is this intuition that animates the community
caretaking exception.450 But the exception’s integrity is undercut by
permitting sworn officers to make arrests while searching pursuant to it.451
The solution lies not in prohibiting community caretaking, but requiring
that nonsworn personnel perform these ostensibly noncriminal searches and
seizures. The same approach should be adopted for the DNA testing
authorized in King. If the only permissible constitutional goal is arrestee
identification,452 the personnel charged with carrying out that goal should be
segregated from the police officers responsible for investigating other
crimes the arrestee may be responsible for.
This is to invoke what Eric Miller has termed “role-based conceptions
of . . . [state] authority.”453 Miller develops the notion in a different
context—exploring the consequences of so-called order-maintenance
policing on the state’s legitimacy in minority communities.454 Miller argues
that relying on sworn officers to police low-level public order disturbances
in the hopes of preventing more serious crimes in minority communities—
what Miller terms “escalation”—undermines the state’s legitimacy in those
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communities. Accordingly, he advocates for assigning order-maintenance
type enforcement to nonsworn personnel.455
A purposive division of labor could minimize goal confusion and
pretext without creating role formalism that precludes appropriate responses
to serious crimes. One might reasonably wonder what nonsworn, state
agents would do if they confronted evidence of criminal wrongdoing in the
course of performing their work. What is the building inspector to do when
she encounters evidence of criminal misconduct in the course of conducting
an inspection? There is no categorical answer here, but there should be
some instances where prosecution is foreclosed in order to preserve the
integrity of a purposive division of labor. For example, evidence of modest
narcotics possession should not be the basis for prosecution when seized
following an inventory search. Such a rule would prevent sworn officers
from pretextually ordering vehicle impoundments where they have a hunch,
but no probable cause that a narcotics violation has occurred.
There may be situations where prosecutors should be permitted to rely
upon criminal evidence identified by a state agent in the course of a
noncriminal search. For example, when the agent comes upon evidence of a
particularly grave criminal offense, we should encourage her to inform the
police. The housing inspector cannot be expected to ignore a dead body that
she happens upon while carrying out a building inspection pursuant to an
administrative warrant. While that is the sort of evidence that no one could
or should ignore, perhaps evidence of drug use or sales is. The building
inspector would view all such evidence through the lens of her official role
as determined by her agency’s programmatic purpose. To the extent that
housing inspectors rely upon citizen complaints and cooperation to ensure
code compliance, that might counsel in favor of “looking the other way”
with some criminal wrongs, but not others. The choice need not be left to
individual agents. In the first instance, a building inspector might report the
existence of criminal evidence to an official within her own bureaucracy
who, in turn, pursuant to some internal guidelines, would make a decision
as to whether to alert the police or not.
Using purpose to parcel institutional responsibilities would not just
reduce goal confusion and pretext. When necessary, courts would be able to
more readily identify the purpose impelling both institutional and individual
action. Rather than delving into the subjective workings of the latter’s
consciousness, courts could simply evaluate whether her investigative
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conduct was consistent with her organization’s programmatic purpose.
Where the answer was “no,” the search would be unconstitutional.
The reform proposed here is far-ranging and would require politically
contentious and potentially expensive institutional reform. These
constraints may make full realization of a purposive division of labor
impractical. But the proposal here is not “all or nothing.” Any effort to
control police departments’ mandate sprawl would be an improvement.
This might entail assigning some noncriminal task to other social service
agencies. It might also mean better segregating sworn from nonsworn task
assignment within police departments.
2. A Purposive Typology of Criminal Enforcement
This Article’s core insight also applies within the ambit of criminal
law enforcement. Even if limited to criminal law enforcement, police
departments would still be responsible for pursuing a wide of range of
enforcement goals. Eric Miller’s work identifying the unique dangers of
order-maintenance policing is, again, illustrative.456 But the problem is
broader. The tactics that departments use in pursuing different goals
generate different threats to privacy, liberty, and democratic transparency.
The use of specialized units highlights this fact. Most medium and large
police departments rely upon specialization. Specialized units, such as those
targeting narcotics crimes, may be significantly more arrest-intensive than
patrol units.457 Specialized units may also operate undercover, collecting
intelligence in a manner more akin to spying than conventional patrol.458
For example, specialized units that focus upon terrorism and organized
crime are likely to rely upon strategies of infiltration and surveillance.459
The N.Y.P.D.’s much-criticized efforts to identify “homegrown” Muslim
terrorists are a case in point.460
It may be that enforcement agencies themselves are in the best position
to create and monitor fine-grained conduct rules for different categories of
agents.461 Such internal rulemaking seems particularly important given the
456
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Court’s repeated insistence that it has only limited ability to control officer
behavior in the field.462 This dilemma is, in part, a function of the
transactional framing that is pervasive in criminal procedure.463 Courts
generally view criminal procedure cases as discrete encounters between a
given suspect or officer rather than as broad regulatory dilemmas. Were it
otherwise, the Court might have been slower to dismiss the kind of
challenge that was at the center of Whren. In that case, the D.C. police
department had a policy limiting undercover officers’ authority to conduct
traffic stops.464 The officers in that case appear to have violated the policy,
which is another way of saying that they deviated from the programmatic
purpose of undercover policing. The Court, of course, was unwilling to
create a Fourth Amendment remedy for the deviation.465 While
constitutional criminal procedure need not be the primary mechanism for
vindicating such deviations, courts should incentivize departments to see to
it that their officers behave honestly and transparently with their units’
programmatic purposes.
CONCLUSION
State purpose does and should play a significant role in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. This is both on account of the concept’s
salience as a precept of state legitimacy and the unique coerciveness of
searches and seizures. The Court has failed, however, to develop a robust
Fourth Amendment framework for analyzing state purpose because of
structural impediments: transactional framing and enforcement agencies’
sprawling mandates. Courts typically confront Fourth Amendment issues in
individual criminal cases and are frequently trying to untangle official
purposes that are entangled by design. These are not problems that can be
simply resolved by altering a legal test or creating a new one. Rather,
Fourth Amendment purpose should be the basis for a forward-looking
precept of institutional design. It is not for courts alone to ensure that
LaFave, Controlling Discretion by Administrative Regulations: The Use, Misuse, and
Nonuse of Police Rules and Policies in Fourth Amendment Adjudication, 89 MICH. L. REV.
442, 504–08 (1990). Part of the difficulty is likely that municipal police departments do not
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departments’) sprawling mandates.
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officers’ conduct properly aligns with the agency or unit’s programmatic
purpose. All branches should be responsible for ensuring that clearly and
specifically defined notions of purpose are used to structure institutional
and individual mandates well in advance of any search or seizure.
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